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THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: SEEKING CLARITY AND 
PRECISION AMID INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE 
HOSANNA-TABOR FRAMEWORK 
ABSTRACT 
Supported by statute and the Constitution, the ministerial exception bars 
employees who are deemed “ministers” from bringing discrimination claims 
against their religious employer. Religious employers—whether a religious 
association, corporation, educational institution, or society—are exempted from 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of religion. The ministerial exception is no longer 
limited to religious discrimination and has been expanded to apply in cases of 
gender, race, age, and disability discrimination. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that a constitutional ministerial 
exception existed and was supported by the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court set forth a four-factor test by which 
an employee’s “ministerial status” was to be assessed: (1) whether the religious 
institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the employee’s title 
reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the employee used 
that title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the employee’s 
duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the church. 
The Court declined to adopt a rigid formula, leaving lower courts to interpret 
for themselves how these factors should be applied. Thus, lower courts were not 
only inconsistent in their analyses of subsequent cases, but also demonstrated a 
tendency toward favoring the religious employer. In 2020, the Supreme Court 
again addressed the ministerial exception, emphasizing function as key and 
broadening the exception’s potential application. 
This Comment proposes a solution for the inconsistencies and ambiguities 
that have resulted from the Court’s four-factor test for classifying “ministers” 
who then fall within the “ministerial exception,” and thereby suggests that the 
Court’s most recent holding failed to properly contain the exception. First, the 
proposed solution requires a balance of function and title based upon a 
reasonable construction of the surrounding factual circumstances. Function 
should be given the greatest weight if satisfied, but factors relating to title should 
not be ignored. Second, the proposed solution requires an analysis into the 
religious importance of the employee and the circumstances proffered to support 
or refute that importance. The analysis must be conducted with an eye toward 
the purpose of the exception: avoiding government interference with 
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employment decisions relating to those employees whose functions are essential 
to the employer’s religious mission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most employers in the United States are prohibited from engaging in 
discrimination based on religion, race, sex, disability, or national origin—such 
is the norm and thus the expectation of most employees. Most employers, 
however, are not religious employers. Religious employers, contrary to what 
may seem a key tenet of modern American jurisprudence, are not always subject 
to antidiscrimination laws. This apparent anomaly stems from Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that the prohibition on employers with 
more than fifteen employees from discriminating on the basis of religion does 
not apply to “any religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society” that hires individuals of the associated religion to perform work 
connected with the activities of that religion.1 In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld 
this exemption for religious organizations in Presiding Bishop v. Amos, holding 
that the exemption served the permissible goal of preventing significant or 
excessive governmental interference in matters of church governance.2 
Over time, courts expanded their understanding of the statutory exemption 
to extend to forms of discrimination other than religious.3 In 2012, the Supreme 
Court elevated this statutory accommodation into a constitutional mandate under 
the First Amendment, affirming the existence of a constitutional ministerial 
exception.4 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, the Court held that a Lutheran school teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a 
minister and thus barred from bringing a discrimination claim against her 
employer.5 Perich was a “called” teacher with significant religious training and 
background, who taught both secular and religious subjects, led her students in 
prayer, and led a school-wide chapel service about twice a year.6 Perich brought 
suit, alleging she was terminated in retaliation for threatening to file a claim 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—a suit her employer argued 
was barred by the ministerial exception.7 The Court adopted a four-factor test to 
determine whether the employee was a minister: (1) whether the religious 
institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the employee’s title 
reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the employee used 
 
 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. 
 2 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 3 See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); infra note 59. 
 4 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 178. The Court explained that a “called” teacher is one “regarded as having been called to their 
vocation by God.” Id. at 177. 
 7 Id. at 180. 
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that title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the employee’s 
duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the church.8 
The Court held that the circumstances surrounding each of these factors 
indicated that the employee was a minister, though it declined to adopt a rigid 
formula that would define the correct balance of factors and a threshold of what 
is or is not enough to signify a minister.9 
Until 2012, various circuits had applied different methods for determining 
whether an employee was a minister for purposes of the exception.10 The most 
widely applied approach was the “primary duties test,” which looked to whether 
the employee’s duties consisted primarily of administering religion and serving 
the religious mission of the church.11 Another version of that test balanced 
religious duties with non-religious duties.12 Meanwhile, some circuits adopted a 
three-part test that considered (1) the criteria upon which the employment 
decision was made, (2) the employee’s religious qualifications, and (3) whether 
the employee engaged in traditionally ecclesiastical activities.13 The Second 
Circuit modified this test by adding a sliding scale where the more pervasively 
religious a religious institution was, the less religious an employee’s role had to 
be to qualify as ministerial.14 Though Hosanna-Tabor is precedent, its flexibility 
left lower courts with much discretion in deciding how they would interpret the 
test and to what extent they would adopt and apply the Court’s four-factor 
analysis—leading to inconsistency in application and results.15 While the 
employee’s function, the fourth factor, has been generally accepted as the most 
 
 8 Id. at 191–92. 
 9 Id. at 190. 
 10 Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 11 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; accord Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 
1243–44 (10th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 
(6th Cir. 2010); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); Ross v. Metro. Church 
of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 12 Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Redhead 
v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 13 Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77; accord Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–41 (7th 
Cir. 2006); Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. 3:01CV2352(MRK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, 
at *15–18 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004). 
 14 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208. 
 15 Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *18–19 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 29, 2019) (holding that the Director of Public Affairs was not a minister). Compare Fratello v. Roman 
Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 210 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the school principal was a minister), 
and Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the school 
teacher was a minister), with Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the 
school teacher was not a minister). 
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important consideration,16 courts have diverged on how much weight should be 
given to the first three factors, with some courts choosing to ignore them 
altogether.17 Circuits have also varied on how many of the four factors should 
be present and how strongly each factor must weigh in favor of applying the 
exception.18 
The ministerial exception is alive and well today, and its ambiguities once 
again carried it to the Supreme Court in the 2020 case Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School v. Morrissey-Berru, which originated in the Ninth Circuit.19 The circuit 
court in Morrissey-Berru held that the four Hosanna-Tabor factors favored the 
conclusion that the employee was not a minister.20 However, where most courts 
would have likely held that the extensive nature of the employee’s religious 
functions sufficed to prove ministerial status, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily 
on the lack of any titular proof of ministerial status rather than the existence of 
highly significant religious functions.21 By taking such a unique approach, the 
Ninth Circuit gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to revisit the guidance it 
had given in Hosanna-Tabor. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with 
Biel v. St. James School, another Ninth Circuit case, and certified the issue of 
whether adjudication of a claim is barred by the ministerial exception when an 
employee carries out important religious functions.22 The Court held that the 
plaintiffs in both cases should have qualified under the exception,23 that the 
Ninth Circuit had erred in treating the Hosanna-Tabor factors as necessary 
elements of a checklist,24 and that the First Amendment bars the adjudication of 
such employment-discrimination claims.25 
Based on the great level of discretion given to lower courts, now made 
broader by the Supreme Court,26 it may become more difficult to contain 
 
 16 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 17 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205 (giving little to no weight to title); Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661 (noting that at 
most two Hosanna-Tabor factors were satisfied, and that function outweighed the more formalistic factors); 
Biel, 911 F.3d at 608 (adopting a reasonable construction in balancing function and title); Morrissey-Berru v. 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., No. 17-56624, 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019) (requiring satisfaction of 
both function and title). 
 18 See supra note 17. 
 19 Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). 
 20 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2055–58 (2020). 
 23 Id. at 2066–67. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 2069. 
 26 Id. at 2071–72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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application of the ministerial exception to employees who serve the core 
religious purpose of the employer. The range of employees to whom the 
ministerial exception has been extended demonstrates the broad and perhaps 
improper application of the exception, which will only be furthered by the 
Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru. This broad application is particularly 
evident in cases involving teachers who have been tasked with teaching a secular 
subject, but who also have religious duties ranging from minor to predominant. 
While presumably a teacher with negligible religious duties should be 
differentiated from a teacher with significant and constant religious duties, many 
courts have not taken this approach, in part due to the subjectivity of what the 
religious employer itself would consider to be negligible versus significant and 
courts’ fear of intruding on church autonomy in that expectation. Balancing facts 
in whichever way they see fit, courts have expanded the definition of “minister,” 
and the lack of clear guidance by the Supreme Court prior to Morrissey-Berru 
and ambiguity in the statutory language permitted this expansion. The 
ministerial exception by its nature provides great freedom to religious employers 
in their employment decisions,27 and courts have been extremely deferential to 
this freedom, tending to favor the religious employer.28 While religious freedom 
is a positive and key tenet of the Constitution,29 it cannot be extended so far as 
to impinge entirely on more recent—but also key—principles and rights, such 
as freedom from discrimination. Therefore, rather than broaden the exception 
even further, as was done in Morrissey-Berru, the test set forth by Hosanna-
Tabor must be better defined to contain its application to employees who are 
ministerial to an extent that the exemption’s purpose is served. Thus, this 
Comment proposes a solution that seeks to provide a clarified mode of analysis 
that limits application of the ministerial exception to employees whose functions 
are truly essential to fulfilling the religious mission of the employer. 
Part I of this Comment provides the constitutional, statutory, and case law 
background that led to Hosanna-Tabor, the decision and analysis of the Court 
in Hosanna-Tabor, the lower courts’ interpretations of the four-factor test, and 
the Supreme Court’s 2020 reinterpretation of Hosanna-Tabor. Part II discusses 
the already proposed solutions to the criticized application of both the Hosanna-
Tabor factors and the ministerial exception in general. Finally, Part III proposes 
a clarification of the four-factor analysis based on pre- and post-Hosanna-Tabor 
 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. 
 28 Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 210 (2d Cir. 2017); Grussgott v. 
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2018); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. 
Supp. 3d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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modes of analysis and based on the concerns raised by Hosanna-Tabor, the 
dissent in Morrissey-Berru, and the ministerial exception as a whole. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The principles of religious freedom protected by the First Amendment were 
key protections the founders sought to safeguard.30 Despite their fundamental 
importance to the U.S. Constitution, there has been much debate as to how these 
principles, namely freedom to exercise and freedom from establishment, should 
be applied in cases involving religious institutions and their ministers.31 This 
Part will serve as a primer to the most current discussion surrounding the 
exception, in four sections. Section A discusses the history of the ministerial 
exception. Section B analyzes Hosanna-Tabor, the case that elevated the 
ministerial exception to a constitutional mandate. Section C examines the 
current circuit splits regarding the application of Hosanna-Tabor, and how the 
predictions of both the critics and champions of Hosanna-Tabor have come to 
fruition in those cases. Finally, Section D addresses the Supreme Court’s most 
recent decision surrounding the ministerial exception: Morrissey-Berru. 
A. History of the Ministerial Exception 
The ministerial exception has its roots in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution32 and has been further informed by statute,33 along with various 
cases.34 As it exists today, the exemption is understood to allow a religious 
institution to hire or fire their “ministers” free from interference by the state, 
even if those decisions violate state or federal antidiscrimination laws.35 A 
secular court’s involvement is limited to determining whether the employee 
bringing a claim is a “minister” and therefore covered by the exemption.36 This 
section will first address the statutory basis for the exception, followed by the 
constitutional bases for the exception and the resulting case law. 
 
 30 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 
41 (4th ed. 2016). 
 31 Id. at 235–38. 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. 
 34 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972); Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169–71 (4th Cir. 1985); Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 
627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 35 See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 553; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169–71; Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292. 
 36 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). 
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1. Statutory Basis 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits employers with more than fifteen 
employees from discriminating on the basis of religion.”37 However, section 702 
of Title VII of the Act provides that this prohibition does not apply to “any 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” that hires 
individuals of the associated religion to perform work connected with the 
activities of that religion.38 The exemption to section 702 was upheld in 1987 by 
the Court in Presiding Bishop v. Amos.39 In Amos, a building engineer for a 
gymnasium subunit of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was 
terminated because he failed to meet the qualifications for membership in the 
church.40 The employee brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
alleging discrimination on the basis of religion.41 The Church defended its 
decision based on section 702 of Title VII.42 The employee engineer argued that 
section 702 did not apply and claimed that if section 702 was construed to permit 
religious discrimination by religious employers against employees in 
nonreligious positions, it would violate the Establishment Clause and 
unjustifiably favor religion.43 The Court, however, disagreed with the 
employee’s argument.44 It held that “applying section 702’s exemption to 
religious organizations’ secular activities does not violate the Establishment 
Clause,”45 and that applying the section 702 exemption is “not unconstitutional 
simply because it allows churches to advance religion” as long as the 
government has not itself “advanced religion through its own activities and 
influence.”46 Such “benevolent neutrality” serves the “permissible legislative 
purpose . . . [of] alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious institutions to define and carry out their religious missions.”47 
 
 37 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234. 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234. 
 39 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
339 (1985). 
 40 Id. at 330. 
 41 Id. at 331. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.; see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 235. 
 44 Amos, 483 U.S. at 339. 
 45 Id. at 336. 
 46 Id. at 337 (stating that government interference that advances religion through its own activities and 
influence is the type of interference that would have the forbidden “effects” set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971), which applied a three-part test to determine whether a challenged law serves a “secular 
legislative purpose”). 
 47 Id. at 334, 335 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
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While section 702 ensures a primarily religious institution’s ability to choose 
its employees, it “only allows such organizations to favor employees who share 
their religion” and does not address discrimination on any other basis.48 Section 
702 thus provides background to the development of the ministerial exception, 
but it does not provide an answer to the question of who qualifies as a minister 
and whether religious institutions could discriminate on bases other than religion 
itself. The ministerial exception, therefore, built upon the exemption from Title 
VII and developed further in response to Title VII’s ambiguities.49 
2. Constitutional Bases in Pre-Hosanna-Tabor Case Law 
A constitutional justification for the ministerial exception based on the First 
Amendment arose for the first time in 1972, when the Fifth Circuit articulated 
that the ministerial exception, as an exemption to Title VII, applied in instances 
of discrimination outside of just religious discrimination.50 The holding in 
McClure v. Salvation Army51 arose out of allegations of gender discrimination 
asserted by McClure, a female minister, against her employer, the Salvation 
Army Church.52 McClure alleged that she had received a lower salary and fewer 
benefits than her male counterparts, and that she had been discharged because 
of her complaints to superiors and to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).53 The Salvation Army moved to dismiss, claiming that it 
was covered by the religious exemption of Title VII.54 Agreeing with the 
Salvation Army, the court reasoned that applying Title VII to the employment 
relationship between church and minister would require an investigation into 
church practices, even if administrative, chipping at the wall of separation 
between church and state.55 To allow such regulation by the government would 
unconstitutionally impinge on the religious freedom guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.56 Therefore, the court determined that, despite the unspecific 
wording of section 702 of Title VII, “Congress did not intend . . . to regulate the 
employment relationship between church and minister.”57 McClure thus 
extended the Title VII exemption to cases of employment discrimination outside 
 
 48 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234. 
 49 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 558, 560. 
 52 Id. at 555. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 555–56. 
 55 Id. at 560. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 560–61. 
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the realm of religion.58 Thereafter, every lower federal court adopted McClure’s 
interpretation of the ministerial exception, extending it to cases of employment 
discrimination based on race, gender, age, and disability, and calling on the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment for support.59 
Subsequent case law built upon the constitutional and statutory ministerial 
exception to develop standards to answer resulting ambiguities surrounding the 
exception. One early test was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Starkman v. Evans 
in 1999,60 and it was later followed by courts in the Second and Seventh 
Circuits.61 The test called for the consideration of several factors to determine 
whether an employee qualified as a minister within the meaning of the 
exception, and it was articulated in three parts.62 First, Starkman, which involved 
the employment of a Choirmaster and Director of Music at a Methodist church, 
required an examination of the hiring criteria.63 Second, it required consideration 
of the employee’s qualifications and authorization to “perform the ceremonies 
of the Church.”64 Last, it looked to whether the employee engaged in 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Rockwell v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese, 02-239-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20992, at *8–9 (1st Cir. 
Oct. 30, 2002) (gender); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (race); Petruska v. Gannon 
Univ., 1:04-cv-80, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54884, at *24–26 (3d. Cir. Mar. 31, 2008) (gender); Rayburn v. Gen. 
Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169–71 (4th Cir. 1985) (gender and race); Starkman v. Evans, 
198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (disability); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 
2007) (disability); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776–77 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (disability); Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (age); McNeil 
v. Missouri Ann. Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 2-10-cv-04154-NKL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98184, 
at *10–12 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (disability); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 
1982) (gender); Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010) (gender 
and age); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (race); EEOC v. Cath. 
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (gender). 
 60 Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77. 
 61 See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1039–41; Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. 3:01CV2352(MRK), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, at *15–18 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004). 
 62 Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77. 
 63 Id. at 176. For example, was the hiring decision based upon the employee’s religious background and 
experience, and upon the employee’s ability to apply that experience to the position in question? Here, to be 
qualified for her role, the employee was required to have a master’s degree in music and “extensive course work 
in Church Music in Theory and Practice, Choral Conducting, Worship, Choral Vocal Methods, Hymnology, 
Bible, Theology, Christian Education, and United Methodist History, Doctrine and Polity.” Id. The job 
description for her position stated, “[T]he Director of Music is responsible for the planning, recruiting, 
implementing and evaluating of music and congregational participation in all aspects of the ministry at [the 
Church].” Id. The parties also did not dispute that religious music played an important role in the spiritual mission 
of the church. Id. 
 64 Id. Here, the court found that the employee’s duties of planning worship liturgy, “coordinat[ing] church 
and worship activities relating to the church’s Music Ministry,” rehearsing and conducting choirs, hiring 
“musicians and lower level music ministry directors, and writing articles about the church’s Music Ministry for 
the weekly church bulletin” made her “qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the church.” Id. 
BARRICK_12.2.20 12/3/2020 1:17 PM 
2020] THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 475 
traditionally ecclesiastical or religious activities, “including whether [she] 
‘attend[ed] to the religious needs of the faithful.’”65 The Starkman test asked 
clear questions to guide this analysis of ministerial status—clarity missing from 
some later cases that feared too much government involvement could arise from 
a court’s determination of what qualifies as “traditionally ecclesiastical or 
religious.”66 
While the three-part Starkman test guided the Fifth, Second, and Seventh 
Circuits, the Second Circuit also recognized a sliding-scale analysis, referenced 
in Rweyemamu v. Cote, to determine whether an employee was a minister who 
fit within the exception.67 While the “sliding-scale” approach was only later 
applied in Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hospital, Rweyemamu was the first case to 
bring forth the idea.68 The court in Rweyemamu held that a priest was barred 
under the statutory ministerial exception from bringing a race discrimination 
claim against his diocese and bishop.69 While not the foundation of the court’s 
holding, the court recognized the “sliding-scale” and noted that “the more 
‘pervasively religious’ the relationship between an employee and his employer, 
the more salient the free exercise concern becomes.”70 Thus, the more religious 
an employer institution is, the less religious an employee’s role must be to 
qualify as a minister; the more religious an employee’s role is, the less religious 
the employer institution need be.71 Through applying this scale, the court 
clarified that, while it believed courts should consider an employee’s function 
over his or her title or ordination status, that function test alone was “too rigid” 
an approach as it “failed to consider the nature of the dispute.”72 
 
 65 Id. at 176 (quoting EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Starkman, the employee 
claimed that “she [had been] designated to be a ‘ministerial presence’ to ailing parishioners on occasion” and 
that “for her and her congregation, music constitutes a form of prayer that is an integral part of worship services 
and Scripture readings.” Id. at 176; see EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 
Unit A July 1981) (noting that traditionally ecclesiastical or religious tasks are those that are “essential to the 
propagation of [the church’s] doctrine”). 
 66 Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175 (quoting Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284). 
 67 Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 2016) (first framing the analysis as a 
“sliding-scale”); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination 
in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979)); Bagni, supra (introducing the idea of what came to be called the sliding-scale 
analysis stemming from the idea that there is a “spiritual epicenter” of a church, “which must be outside the 
scope of civil regulation because otherwise there would invariably be too great an infringement of free-exercise 
rights[;]” however, once the church “acts outside this epicenter and moves closer to the purely secular world, it 
subjects itself to secular regulation proportionate to the degree of secularity of its activities and relationships”). 
 68 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208 (citing Bagni, supra note 67, at 1514); Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182. 
 69 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 200, 210. 
 70 Id. at 208 (citing Bagni, supra note 67, at 1514). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. The court also stated that even a discrimination suit by a lay employee could interfere with the 
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The most widely applied test prior to 2012 was the “primary duties test” set 
forth by the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists and later adopted by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.73 This 
test stated that, “as a general rule, if the employee’s primary duties consist of 
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious 
order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she 
should be considered ‘clergy.’”74 This analysis also involves a determination of 
whether a “position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the 
church.”75 Other circuits, though not expressly, adopted a version of the 
“primary duties” test, which interpreted primary duties in the following manner: 
if an employee’s duties are primarily religious in relation to his or her duties as 
a whole, that employee will be considered a minister; if the employee’s duties 
are not primarily religious, that employee is not a minister.76 Both interpretations 
 
Constitution if the relationship was so “pervasively religious” that judicial interference could “run afoul of the 
Constitution.” Id. 
 73 Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); accord 
Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 2010); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, 
Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 
2007). Rayburn derived this “primary duties test” from the same Columbia Law Review article Rweyemamu 
referenced. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Bagni, supra note 67, at 1545. Some circuits, such as the Ninth, 
declined to adopt any uniform test of “general applicability” and instead applied a “reasonable construction of 
the ministerial exception.” Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 
2010). In Alcazar, the court cites to a prior Ninth Circuit case to support its holding. Id. at 1291. In EEOC v. 
Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, the court analogized to a Fifth Circuit case in which the employee, a secretary, 
was “insufficiently like a minister to trigger the exception” as her role “did not ‘go to the heart of the church’s 
function in the manner of a minister or a seminary teacher’ and . . . was not the type of critically sensitive position 
within the church that McClure sought to protect.’” 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (1982) (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283–85 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). In Alcazar, the plaintiff “affirmatively 
allege[d] he was a seminarian,” and “under any reasonable construction of the ministerial exception,” he met the 
definition of a minister. 627 F.3d at 1292. The facts demonstrated a position of the sort McClure sought to protect 
and was in stark contrast with the secretarial position at issue in Pacific Press. Therefore, the court determined 
it was unnecessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the scope of the ministerial exception. Id. 
 74 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bagni, supra note 67, at 1545). In Rayburn, the court found that 
the following duties of the employee, an associate in pastoral care, were primarily religious: “the associate in 
pastoral care at [the Church] was pastoral advisor to the Sabbath School that introduces children to the life of 
the church,” led Bible study groups, served as a counselor and pastor to the singles group as liaison between the 
church and those receiving its message, led the congregation in services and solemn rites, and occasionally 
preached from the pulpit. Id. at 1168. The court also discussed the sensitivity requirements of the position, and 
the presumptive need people have for spiritual leadership when they turn to a pastor for help—engaging in what 
may be too ecclesiastical for the Hosanna-Tabor Court. Id. 
 75 Id. at 1169. 
 76 Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Redhead 
v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In Redhead, the court found that a 
teacher who taught one hour of Bible study each day, attended worship services with her students, but otherwise 
taught purely secular subjects, was not a minister. Redhead, 440 F. Supp. 2d. at 221; see also Katherine Hinkle, 
Comment, What’s in a Name? The Definition of “Minister” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
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of the “primary duties” test provided a fairly clear mode of analysis—the 
employee is a minister if either (1) religious duties outweigh secular duties; or 
(2) the employee’s duties consist of those laid out in Rayburn, and the 
employee’s role is of spiritual or pastoral importance to the church’s mission.77 
The “primary duties” test implies in name a balancing of secular and religious 
duties in some manner, and it places its entire emphasis on function. 
B. Hosanna-Tabor and Its Reception 
In the 2012 case Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, the Supreme Court made the 
ministerial exception a constitutional command and set forth an analytical 
framework by which to determine when an employee qualifies as a minister for 
purposes of the exception.78 Hosanna-Tabor arose after respondent Cheryl 
Perich, a “called”79 teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School, was terminated for what she alleged was retaliation for threatening to 
file an ADA claim.80 Hosanna-Tabor hired Perich as a “called” teacher after she 
had completed her training, upon which Perich was “designat[ed as] a 
commissioned minister.”81 Her duties included teaching secular subjects, 
teaching a religion class, leading her students in daily prayer and devotional 
exercises, taking her students to a weekly school-wide chapel service, and 
leading the chapel service about twice a year.82 After five years of teaching at 
Hosanna-Tabor, Perich developed narcolepsy and spent the first part of the 
2004–05 school year on disability leave.83 She alerted the school in January 2005 
that she would be able to return the following month.84 The school notified 
Perich that her position had been filled by a lay teacher for the remainder of the 
 
and Sch. v. EEOC, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 305–07 (2013) (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169). But 
see Clapper v. Chesapeake Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32554 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (focusing on the employee’s primary duties in the context of the school’s overall religious purpose, 
rather than the amount of time spent on religious and secular duties each day, respectively, and holding that an 
employee who taught elementary school, led students in prayer, conducted ten minutes of worship daily, and 
taught Bible study was a minister fulfilling the goal of the church). 
 77 Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362–63; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Clapper, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32554, at 
*18–21; Ross, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. 
 78 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012). 
 79 The school in Hosanna-Tabor classifies its teachers as either “called” or “lay.” The court explains, 
“‘[c]alled’ teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible . . . a teacher 
must complete certain academic requirements, including a course of theological study. Once called, a teacher 
receives the formal title ‘Minister of Religion, Commissioned.’” Id. at 177. A lay teacher does not require said 
training and need not be Lutheran, but generally performs the same duties as a called teacher. Id. 
 80 Id. at 179. 
 81 Id. at 178. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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school year, expressed concern that Perich was not ready to reassume her role, 
and offered to pay a portion of Perich’s health insurance premiums in exchange 
for her resignation as a “called” teacher.85 Perich refused this offer, instead 
reporting to school and refusing to leave until she received written 
documentation stating that she had returned to work.86 The principal then 
informed Perich she would likely be fired.87 
Perich subsequently stated her intent to assert her legal rights, and she was 
soon terminated for “insubordination and disruptive behavior” along with the 
“damage she had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school by 
‘threatening to take legal action.’”88 The foregoing violated the church’s 
requirement for internal dispute resolution—a requirement core to Lutheran 
Church doctrine.89 Perich then filed a charge with the EEOC claiming retaliatory 
termination in violation of the ADA, and the EEOC brought suit against 
Hosanna-Tabor.90 Hosanna-Tabor argued that, based on the ministerial 
exception, this suit was barred.91 The district court agreed and granted summary 
judgment for Hosanna-Tabor.92 However, the Sixth Circuit vacated and 
remanded, holding that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the exception.93 
Both the district court and Sixth Circuit court applied the primary duties test in 
their analyses, but the Sixth Circuit contended that the district court had erred in 
its legal conclusion relying on Perich’s title.94 
By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the 
issues of whether the ministerial exception was implicated in an employment 
discrimination suit, and if so, what the analytical framework should be when 
applying the exception.95 The Court held that the exception was implicated, as 
the present case “concern[ed] government interference with an internal church 
decision that affect[ed] the faith and mission of the church itself.”96 It also 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 178–79. 
 87 Id. at 179. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 180. 
 90 Id. at 179–80. 
 91 Id. at 180. 
 92 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 (E.D. Mich. 
2008). 
 93 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 94 Id. at 778–81. 
 95 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
 96 Id. at 190. Contra Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding 
that government regulation of outward, physical acts done for sacramental purpose but in violation of “a valid 
and neutral law of general applicability” was permitted). Here, while the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation is “a 
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looked to the purpose of the exception in Title VII in support of its holding that 
the exception applied, noting that 
requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or 
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere 
employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal 
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs . . . infring[ing] the 
Free Exercise Clause . . . [and] the Establishment Clause.97 
The Court made clear its reluctance to infringe, in any way, on internal church 
decision-making in fear of infringing on the church’s First Amendment rights.98 
It reasoned that the risk of infringement calls for the application of the 
ministerial exception.99 
This case affirmed that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses support the ministerial exception.100 The Free Exercise 
Clause, the Court held, protects “a religious group’s right to shape its own faith 
and mission through its appointments,”101 and prevents the state from interfering 
with a religious group’s freedom to select its own ministers.102 Thus, by 
imposing an unwanted minister on a religious organization, the state infringes 
on the Free Exercise Clause.103 Demonstrating the weight of this right, the 
Supreme Court noted in Sherbert v. Verner that “only the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interests” could justify infringement by the government 
on an individual’s free exercise of religion.104 Sherbert established that not only 
would a law that discriminates on the basis of religion violate the Free Exercise 
Clause, but so, too, would “purely secular legislation [such as the ADA] that 
imposes unintended burdens upon the free exercise of religion.”105 
The Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”106 In the context of a religious 
 
valid and neutral law of general applicability,” the case is distinct because it concerns internal church affairs. 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
 97 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 184. 
 101 Id. at 188. 
 102 Id. at 184. 
 103 Id. at 188. 
 104 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 105 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 291 n.37. 
 106 U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Amos, the Court held that a ministerial exception under section 702 did not 
violate the Establishment Clause after the employee argued it did so by unjustifiably favoring religion. Corp. of 
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institution and its employees, Hosanna-Tabor stated that the Establishment 
Clause “prevents the Government from appointing ministers.”107 The Court 
stated that if it applied antidiscrimination laws to religious organizations, it 
would in turn give “the state the power to determine which individuals will 
minister to the faithful.”108 Such would be an act of “ecclesiastical decision[-
making]” in violation of the Establishment Clause.109 
The EEOC argued that Hosanna-Tabor’s strongly discretionary approach 
diverged from precedent set in Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990 case that 
called for weak neutrality regarding the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses.110 Smith weakened the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses by 
deviating from the strict level of scrutiny set forth in Sherbert.111 The Smith 
Court held the ADA to be a “valid and neutral law of general applicability and 
therefore applicable to the Church, even if it imposed a ‘substantial burden’ on 
the Church school’s operation.”112 While the Court in Smith held, consistent with 
prior cases, that an individual cannot claim a religious exemption from general 
criminal laws, it went further in shaping the standard of review to be used in free 
exercise cases.113 Smith represented a shift from the strict protection of religious 
liberty to a weak neutrality approach.114 
Contrary to the approach in Smith, Hosanna-Tabor set a precedent of strong 
deference to religious institutions in their decisions to terminate employees for 
any reason, and it held that a secular court cannot question those reasons.115 In 
response to the EEOC, the Court distinguished the two cases to justify its 
divergence from Smith, which otherwise may not have supported holding in 
favor of such strong religious deference. 116 All nine justices unanimously agreed 
that there was a “ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the 
 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). 
 107 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184. 
 108 Id. at 188–89. 
 109 Id.; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 223, 237. 
 110 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
 111 Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). 
 112 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237. In Smith, an individual’s ingestion of peyote as a sacramental 
religious practice neither prohibited the termination of his employment, nor his disqualification from state 
unemployment compensation. Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–79). 
 113 Id. at 147. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 237–38 (explaining that the reason for termination need not be religious). 
 116 Id. at 237; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court stated that, while Smith “involved government regulation of ‘outward physical 
acts’ (ingesting peyote) . . . the Hosanna-Tabor facts concerned ‘an internal church decision that affects the faith 
and mission of the church itself.’” Id. By making this distinction, the Court justified giving a different level of 
deference to religious institutions in cases like Hosanna-Tabor than in cases like Smith. 
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First Amendment,” and that a court’s involvement in employment 
discrimination suits against religious institutions was limited to a non-
ecclesiastical analysis of whether the employee is a “minister.”117 
After determining the applicability of the ministerial exception, the Court 
proceeded to analyze the specific facts of the case. 
1. Analytical Framework 
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor set forth a four-part test to determine whether 
an employee is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception: (1) whether 
the religious institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the 
employee’s title reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the 
employee used the title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the 
employee’s job duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission 
of the church.118 The Court declined to adopt a “rigid formula” and instead called 
for consideration of all the circumstances of Perich’s employment.119 The 
resulting test takes into account both the title and function of the employee in 
question, the first three factors falling under the category of “title” and the fourth 
under “function.”120 This subsection conducts a detailed discussion of each part 
to clarify the factors under consideration, and later analyzes whether their 
application by lower courts has achieved the Supreme Court’s purpose or 
whether they require further definition. 
First, the Court asked whether the religious institution held the employee out 
as a minister.121 Here, Hosanna-Tabor did hold Perich out to be a minister—with 
a role distinct from most of its members—in the following ways: Hosanna-Tabor 
issued Perich a “diploma of vocation” entitling her “Minister of Religion, 
Commissioned”; it tasked Perich with performing her office “according to the 
Word of God and the confessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
as drawn from the Sacred Scriptures”; the congregation prayed for her 
“ministrations” to be blessed by God; and the congregation periodically 
reviewed Perich’s ministerial skills and responsibilities and provided for her 
continuing education.122 
 
 117 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 236. 
 118 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92. 
 119 Id. at 190. 
 120 Id. at 191–92. 
 121 Id. at 191. 
 122 Id. 
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Second, the Court looked to the employee’s title and asked whether that title 
reflected a certain degree of religious training.123 Here, the Court held that 
Perich’s title as “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” did reflect “a significant 
degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.”124 
It so held because “to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to complete 
eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical interpretation, church 
doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran teacher.”125 She was required to 
petition for and obtain the endorsement of her local Synod,126 answer a series of 
ministry-related questions, and pass an oral examination administered by a 
Lutheran college faculty committee.127 It took Perich six years to fulfill these 
requirements, and after fulfilling them, she was still only commissioned upon 
election by the congregation in recognition of “God’s call to her to teach.”128 
Thereafter, Perich could only have her call rescinded by “a supermajority vote 
of the congregation—a protection designed to allow her to ‘preach the Word of 
God boldly.’”129 
Third, the Court looked to the employee’s own use of the title and asked 
whether she held herself out as a minister.130 Here, Perich held herself out as a 
minister of the church by accepting the formal call to religious service, “claiming 
a special housing allowance on her taxes only available to employees earning 
their compensation ‘in the exercise of the ministry,’” and indicating in a form 
she submitted to the Synod after termination that she hoped to rejoin the teaching 
ministry.131 
Fourth, the Court looked to the employee’s job duties and asked whether 
those duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the 
church.132 Here, Perich was expressly charged with fulfilling the mission of the 
church,133 and in doing so her responsibilities included teaching religion to her 
 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 174. 
 125 Id. at 191. 
 126 A synod is a regional or national organization of Lutheran congregations. Synod, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synod (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). Here, the term refers to the Missouri 
Synod, the second-largest Lutheran denomination in America, of which Hosanna-Tabor is a member. Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191. 
 127 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 192 (internal quotations omitted). Perich also stated, “I feel that God is leading me to serve in the 
teaching ministry . . . I am anxious to be in the teaching ministry again soon.” Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. Perich was charged with “lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity” and “teach[ing] faithfully the 
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students four days a week, leading them in prayer three times a day, taking them 
to a school-wide chapel service once a week, leading and curating that service 
about twice a year, and leading her students in brief devotional exercises each 
morning.134 Based on the foregoing facts, the Court held that, “as a source of 
religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting the 
Lutheran faith to the next generation.”135 
The Court found that Perich merited ministerial status under each of the four 
factors of analysis: the Hosanna-Tabor church and school held her out to be a 
minister, her title reflected ministerial status, she held herself out to be a 
minister, and her job duties reflected ministerial function.136 Though not all four 
factors were or are necessary for ministerial status to be found, the Court stated 
they were all met here.137 Thus, the Court provided guidance to lower courts in 
the form of a four-factor test, but did so in a manner so averse to rigidity that it 
left lower courts with wide discretion to interpret as they saw fit. 
2. Critics and Champions 
Hosanna-Tabor evoked both support and criticism. Such a result did not take 
long, beginning with Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, which was 
joined by Justice Kagan.138 While Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s opinion, 
he addressed the complexity of the term “minister”139 and the variable 
definitions of “ordination” among religions140—both of which complicate the 
analysis set forth in Hosanna-Tabor.141 Further, he noted that some faiths 
consider a large percentage of their members to be part of the ministry as a 
whole, blurring any line of distinction among employees of the religious 
institution.142 Justice Alito argued that, based on this wide variability, ordination 
and title have not and should not be determinative of an employee’s status.143 
 
Word of God, the Sacred Scripture, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church.” Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 191–92. 
 138 Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 139 Id. (noting that the term “minister” is common in Protestant denominations to refer to members of their 
clergy, but rarely used among other religious groups, such as Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists). 
 140 Id. (noting that ordination has similar significance in most Christian churches and Judaism, but no 
counterpart in some Christian denominations and other religions). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 202. 
 143 Id. Justice Alito also cites to EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit 
A July 1981), to exemplify the longstanding standard that formal ordination is not necessary for the ministerial 
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Rather, the ministerial exception should apply to 
[a] general category of ‘employees’ whose functions are essential to 
the independence of practically all religious groups . . . includ[ing] 
those who serve in positions of leadership . . . perform important 
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious 
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and 
conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.144 
If the religious institution finds that such an employee is no longer able to 
perform these key religious functions, then the institution has the right to remove 
the employee with the protections of the First Amendment.145 Justice Alito 
aimed to make clear that it was Perich’s religious function, rather than her 
ordination status, that made her the type of employee a church must be free to 
appoint or dismiss under the First Amendment and who is subject to the internal 
dispute resolution doctrine of the Lutheran Church.146 
Justice Thomas also concurred in the decision in Hosanna-Tabor, but for a 
different reason than Justices Alito and Kagan.147 He expressed a fear that 
judicial creation of any multifactor analysis or test would disadvantage religions 
“whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside of the ‘Mainstream’ or 
unpalatable to some” and possibly pressure religious groups to “conform its 
beliefs and practices regarding ‘ministers’ to the prevailing secular 
understanding” out of fear of liability.148 Thus, he argued, evidence 
demonstrating that a religious organization sincerely considers an employee to 
be a minister should be sufficient to conclude the employee is covered by the 
ministerial exception.149 
One scholarly criticism of the Hosanna-Tabor test is that the Supreme 
Court’s decision fails to provide adequate guidance to lower courts, paving the 
way for “excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.”150 Such entanglement could arise if lower courts have to delve too 
deeply into specific religious beliefs and doctrines to determine whether an 
employee plays a role in worship or faith-spreading that merits ministerial 
 
exception to apply. Lower courts, he argues, should keep “an eye toward the function of the position,” the label 
serving as “merely a shorthand.” WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 238. 
 144 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 145 Id. at 199. 
 146 Id. at 206. 
 147 Id. at 196–98 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 148 Id. at 197. 
 149 Id. at 197–98. 
 150 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 337. 
BARRICK_12.2.20 12/3/2020 1:17 PM 
2020] THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 485 
function status.151 Another argument criticizes the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
the primary duties test through an overemphasis on the importance of title152 and 
a lack of balancing between religious and secular duties.153 Hosanna-Tabor 
deviated from the primary duties test, noting that even if secular duties occupy 
more time than religious duties, some religious duty combined with title or 
outward representation can indicate “minister.”154 The variation among circuits 
regarding which factors weigh heaviest has led to inconsistent application of the 
test among different courts in cases with similar facts.155 
Finally, the Hosanna-Tabor decision represents a “shift in the prioritization 
of the value of antidiscrimination laws.”156 Despite legislation demonstrating a 
commitment to preventing discrimination, the Court indicated a deeper 
commitment to religious freedom.157 In turn, this shift could lead to increased 
discrimination against employees of religious institutions—a concern raised by 
scholars and religious leaders alike.158 Fear of excessive entanglement gave rise 
to the prioritization of religious freedom over antidiscrimination law, likely 
creating pressure to follow precedent that will percolate throughout the lower 
courts.159 The failure to better define the standard for who is a minister therefore 
arises again: in seeking to conform with precedent, lower courts may tend to side 
with the religious institution over the employee due to the unclear class of 
covered individuals.160 If this is the case, perhaps the goals of flexibility 
announced with the test are not being properly served. 
Not all reactions to the test set forth by Hosanna-Tabor were negative. One 
argument in its favor comes from Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, where 
the Fifth Circuit stated that the lack of any bright line test makes room for 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 335–36; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S at 200 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that, while title 
is relevant, function is more probative in the analysis). 
 153 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 335–36. 
 154 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193. 
 155 See Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James 
Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018); infra Part I.C.4. 
 156 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 342. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 343; John H. Cushman Jr., Religious Groups Greet Ruling with Satisfaction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/us/hosanna-tabor-ruling-welcomed-by-religious-groups.html? 
_r=4&. Reverend Barry W. Lynn—executive Director of Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State—expressed fear that the Court’s ruling would make it more difficult to combat “blatant discrimination.” 
Id. Similarly, Professor Paul Horwitz of the University of Alabama School of Law deemed it our “scholarly and 
moral obligation to think about what happens next . . . [to] acknowledge[] the dangers as well as the value of 
church autonomy.” Id. 
 159 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 343. 
 160 Id. at 345. 
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religious pluralism, whereas a more rigid test would stifle lower courts’ abilities 
to recognize differences among religions.161 This argument champions the 
ability of lower courts to consider religious polity to determine whether an 
employee has a function that is key to faith-spreading and worship, instead of 
disparaging such consideration as “excessive entanglement.”162 Law professors 
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also offer a defense of Hosanna-Tabor.163 They both 
acknowledge and embrace the “expected” variations in lower courts’ application 
of the Hosanna-Tabor test.164 Further, they laud the Court’s consistency with 
the Establishment Clause and its “long-standing constitutional commitment to 
sharply delimit the state’s involvement with religion and religious 
institutions.”165 Finally, many religious and religious liberty groups championed 
the Court’s holding as a “huge victory for religious freedom.”166 Professor Marci 
A. Hamilton of Cardozo School of Law expressed relief that the holding was 
applied narrowly to discrimination suits, thereby rejecting potential claims by 
religious institutions that they have complete autonomy even in sexual 
harassment cases.167 Nathan Diament of the Orthodox Union, an organization 
which had “joined in an amicus brief with the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, the Mormon Church, and the [P]residing [B]ishop of the Episcopal 
Church,” also expressed appreciation for the “expansive freedom of religion” 
this decision preserved.168 
It is most likely that Hosanna-Tabor has had both positive and negative 
effects, resulting precisely from the reasons set forth by its critics and its 
champions. In the years following Hosanna-Tabor, courts have consistently 
applied the factors set forth by Hosanna-Tabor itself, provided for by the test’s 
flexibility.169 What courts have not done, however, is apply these factors 
consistently with one another.170 Courts have tended to favor the religious 
employer in these cases, whether as a result of a precedential pressure for which 
 
 161 Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 162 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 337. 
 163 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2017). 
 164 Id. at 1288. 
 165 Id. at 1280. 
 166 Cushman, supra note 158. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017); Aparicio v. Christian 
Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019); Grussgott v. 
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 170 See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661; Biel, 911 F.3d at 608; Morrissey-Berru v. 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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critics have expressed concern or merely based on the facts of each individual 
case.171 Discretion and flexibility have allowed courts to delineate their own 
interpretations and their own methods of analysis. The main concern is that 
flexibility often yields uncertainty: uncertainty in the scope of the exception, 
uncertainty in weight given to each factor under consideration, and uncertainty 
in whether the four factors must be considered at all. The following cases 
illustrate this wide variability in applying the Hosanna-Tabor factors. 
C. Circuit Splits—How Courts Have Adapted the Vague Hosanna-Tabor 
Analysis 
For better or worse, the Court’s flexible, four-part Hosanna-Tabor test has 
led lower courts to determine largely for themselves how to balance the factors 
under consideration. Whether lower court interpretations and analyses can be 
characterized as “excessive entanglement” rather than fulfilling the needs of a 
pluralistic society is questionable, and arguments can be made for both.172 It is 
also unclear whether courts have felt pressure to prioritize religious freedom and 
favor the employer based on the results of Hosanna-Tabor or whether the facts 
of these cases have truly tended to favor the employer.173 What is certain, 
however, is that lower courts have applied the test in a variety of ways, often 
inconsistently with one another. The inconsistencies among and debates within 
circuits indicate that the Hosanna-Tabor tests should be better defined to allow 
plaintiffs the same chance of success regardless of jurisdiction, despite the risks 
of rigidity the Court sought to avoid. 
1. Overview of Varied Analyses 
The four-factor test enumerated in Hosanna-Tabor has been pared down to 
two main elements for consideration: title and function.174 The first three 
factors—whether the religious institution held the employee out as a minister, 
whether the employee used the title, and whether the employee held herself or 
himself out to be a minister—fall under “title” more generally. The employee’s 
job duties and whether those duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying 
out the mission of the church fall under “function.” While the Supreme Court 
indicated that an employee’s title is not determinative and that an employee’s 
secular duties, among religious duties, do not detract from ministerial status, it 
 
 171 See Fratello, 863 F.3d 190; Aparicio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938; Grussgott, 882 F.3d 655. 
 172 See Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012); Hinkle, supra note 76, at 
302. 
 173 See Hinkle, supra note 76, at 283, 343. 
 174 See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 658, 661. 
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did not provide lower courts with a clear standard by which to balance the 
factors.175 Thus, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have formed 
their own interpretations and balancing tests within the scope of the Hosanna-
Tabor analysis, leading up to the 2020 Supreme Court case: Morrissey-Berru.176 
2. The Second Circuit 
One addition the Second Circuit has made to the Hosanna-Tabor analysis is 
its earlier idea of a sliding scale, where “the more religious the employer 
institution is, the less religious the employee’s functions must be to qualify [as 
a minister],” and vice versa.177 Nowhere in Hosanna-Tabor was such a scale 
proposed. Rather, this sliding scale idea stems from the pre-Hosanna-Tabor 
Second Circuit precedent in Rweyemamu,178 which the Second Circuit applied 
in Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hospital to determine that the ministerial exception 
applied to a “pervasively religious”179 employee in the context of his almost 
entirely secular employer.180 In Penn, the court, on a motion for summary 
judgment, did not question its earlier finding that the employee chaplain was a 
minister for purposes of the exception.181 The employee’s role was “pervasively 
religious,” as he worked in the Department of Pastoral Care and was responsible 
for ministry to patients and their families.182 The hospital was a “non-
sectarian”183 institution; however, it maintained a connection with the United 
Methodist Church, and its mission statement “emphasize[d] an ecumenical 
program of pastoral care.”184 Thus, the court held that the hospital was acting as 
a religious organization, even though it was in reality a secular institution.185 
 
 175 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 193 (2012) (noting that 
even the “heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping 
to manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the upkeep of 
facilities”). 
 176 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). 
 177 Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 29, 2019) (citing Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2016)). Penn held 
that a chaplain at a now-secular hospital was a minister for purposes of the exception because he had an 
“exceedingly ministerial role,” he worked in the Department of Pastoral Care, and the hospital’s mission 
statement “emphasize[d] an ‘ecumenical program of pastoral care.’” 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182, 184. 
 178 Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 179 Id. at 208. 
 180 Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182. 
 181 Id. at 181. 
 182 Id. at 179–82. 
 183 Id. at 178. 
 184 Id. at 184. 
 185 Id. 
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Another standard that continues to permeate Second Circuit cases is the idea 
that the “substance of [an] employee’s responsibilities . . . is far more important” 
than title—an exaggerated version of Hosanna-Tabor’s majority holding.186 In 
Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, the court held that the 
principal of a Catholic school was a minister under the exception, though her 
title was not “inherently religious,” and, as a woman, she could not have been 
ordained in the Catholic Church.187 The court still found her to be a minister for 
purposes of the ministerial exception based on the many religious functions she 
performed to carry out the school’s religious mission, as well as her holding 
herself out as a spiritual leader of the school.188 The Second Circuit has focused 
“principally” on the functions of the employee, which it indicated was the 
correct approach years earlier in Rweyemamu.189 It also interpreted Hosanna-
Tabor as an instruction “only as to what [courts] might take into account as 
relevant, including the four considerations on which it relied; it neither limits the 
inquiry to those considerations nor requires their application in every case.”190 
Another Second Circuit case, Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., applied the 
Hosanna-Tabor factors and acknowledged the sliding-scale approach, but, 
significantly, decided against application of the ministerial exception.191 In 
Aparicio, the employee alleged that his religious employer had a gender-biased 
policy and that he was discriminatorily terminated for vocally opposing that 
policy.192 The employee’s title was Director of Public Affairs, but pre-
employment documents stated he was “part of a ministry,” and his offer letter 
stated that the employer was “seeking employees who view their work as a 
calling.”193 The employee claimed he was not required to complete any rigorous 
religious training to be considered for the position, and he only completed a 
 
 186 Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 207 (2d Cir. 2017). Hosanna-Tabor did 
not specify what weight should be given to each factor under consideration. However, Justice Alito argued that 
Perich’s functional importance was the most important consideration, while the other factors were probative but 
not determinative. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 206 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 187 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 210; see Angela Giuffrida, ‘Save Catholic Church’ by Lifting Ban on Female 
Priests, Activists Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/ 
catholic-church-lift-ban-on-female-priests-activists-say (“[T]he topic of [women] becoming priests is still very 
much taboo.”). 
 188 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 208–10. 
 189 Id. at 202. 
 190 Id. at 204–05. 
 191 Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–19 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019). 
 192 Id. at *4–5. 
 193 Id. at *14–15. 
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required training on theological topics that he claimed were irrelevant to him.194 
Functionally, the employee’s job duties focused solely on raising funds for the 
organization and dealing with donors, and such was set forth in his offer letter.195 
Based on the facts of the case and under the four Hosanna-Tabor factors, the 
court found that the employee was not a minister.196 The court placed little to no 
emphasis on the employee’s secular title, nor on the fact that his pre-employment 
documents explicitly stated he was joining a ministry.197 After finding the facts 
insufficient to make a conclusion on the second two factors, the court based its 
final decision on Fratello’s interpretation of the Hosanna-Tabor test, focusing 
on the fourth factor—function—as the most important consideration, and held 
that the employee did not satisfy it and was therefore not a minister.198 Aparicio 
involved a more clearly secular employee, making the analysis slightly easier 
than in Fratello or in the following cases. 
3. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has taken a less extreme approach than the Second Circuit, 
acknowledging that the determination of ministerial status should be a balance 
between function and title, while simultaneously indicating what that balance 
should be more clearly than Hosanna-Tabor. In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian 
Fellowship, the Sixth Circuit employed a reasonable approach based on 
Hosanna-Tabor’s flexible factors: “where both factors—formal title and 
religious function—are present, the ministerial exception clearly applies.”199 
The employee in Conlon brought a claim of gender discrimination, alleging she 
was terminated for “failing to reconcile her marriage” when similarly situated 
male employees who had divorced during employment were neither disciplined 
nor terminated.200 The court held that both factors, title and function, weighed 
in favor of applying the ministerial exception to this employee, the spiritual 
director of an “evangelical campus mission.”201 The employee’s formal title was 
either “spiritual director” or “Spiritual Formation Specialist”—both of which 
contain wording that conveys a religious meaning.202 Functionally, the 
 
 194 Id. at *16. 
 195 Id. at *18. 
 196 Id. at *19. 
 197 Id. at *14–15. 
 198 Id. at *18–19. The court found that the employee’s job seemed to center solely on raising funds for the 
organization and dealing with donors, duties that were also stated in his offer letter. Id. Further, his performance 
reviews and evaluations centered only on fundraising success, workplace attitude, and efficiency. Id. 
 199 Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 853 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 200 Id. at 832. 
 201 Id. at 831, 835. 
 202 Id. at 834–35. 
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employee’s duties included helping others cultivate “intimacy with God and 
growth in Christ-like character through personal and corporate spiritual 
disciplines.”203 As to the substance reflected in the employee’s title, the court 
held that the employee’s certification in “spiritual direction”—with no further 
information as to what that entailed, compared to Perich’s training in Hosanna-
Tabor—did not set the employee apart from lay employees.204 Thus, the factor 
was not satisfied.205 Finally, the employee did not hold herself out as a minister 
through her own use of the ministerial title because “nothing in the pleadings 
suggest[ed] that [she] had the sort of public role of interacting with the 
community as an ambassador to the faith that rises to the level of Perich’s 
leadership role within her church, school, and community.”206 While the court 
did not resolve the ambiguity as to whether function or title alone would suffice, 
its approach in comparing the facts to those of Hosanna-Tabor—where all four 
factors were satisfied—is well reasoned.207 
4. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits: A Comparison 
In the aftermath of Hosanna-Tabor, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
were presented with cases involving teachers whose balance of religious and 
secular duties were similar in scope.208 The circuits diverged, however, on their 
outcomes, possibly based on minor factual differences, but perhaps also as a 
result of a difference in analysis. This difference largely pares down to two 
questions: (1) how much religious function is enough to favor application of the 
ministerial exception; and (2) when a factor is satisfied to an extent that it 
significantly weighs on the analysis. 
In the 2018 Seventh Circuit case Grussgott v. Milwaukee,209 a teacher at a 
private Jewish day school brought an ADA claim against the school, asserting 
that she had been terminated because of cognitive issues she suffered as a result 
of her brain tumor.210 The school moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
 
 203 Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 836. 
 209 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 210 Id. at 657. Grussgott ceased working during her recovery. After receiving treatment, she suffered from 
memory and other cognitive issues. Id. Just under a year after returning to work, Grussgott was 
“taunted . . . about her memory problems” by a parent during a phone call in which she was unable to remember 
an event. Id. Subsequently, Grussgott’s husband sent an email from Grussgott’s work email address “criticizing 
the parent for being disrespectful.” Id. Grussgott was terminated thereafter. Id. 
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that the ministerial exception barred Grussgott’s lawsuit.211 Thus, the court 
conducted the Hosanna-Tabor analysis,212 looking to the employee’s formal 
title, the substance reflected in that title, the employee’s use of that title, and the 
important religious functions she performed for the religious institution.213 
However, the court expressly stated that the factors are examined “because they 
provide a useful framework,” and that it is important to recognize that not all 
four considerations are necessary in every case.214 
First, the court concluded that Grussgott’s title indicated that her role was 
not ministerial.215 She identified her role as “grade school teacher,”216 and even 
if her title was “Hebrew teacher,” as that was the subject she taught, this title 
would not alone prove a religious role.217 As to the second part of the analysis, 
the court found that the substance reflected in Grussgott’s job title did weigh in 
favor of applying the exception.218 “[T]eachers at the school were not required 
to complete rigorous religious requirements comparable to [Perich] in Hosanna-
Tabor,” and, although Grussgott obtained the required Tal Am certification,219 
the lack of description of what the certification required did not indicate any 
strong religious substance in her role as a teacher.220 However, the Hebrew 
teachers at the school were expected to incorporate religious teachings into their 
lessons, per the unified Tal Am curriculum.221 Grussgott’s resume demonstrated 
“significant religious teaching experience, which the former principal said was 
a critical factor in the school hiring her.”222 Therefore, the court found that the 
substance reflected in Grussgott’s title, both as conveyed to her by the school’s 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 658. Outside of the Hosanna-Tabor analysis as to whether Grussgott was a minister, the court 
also looked to whether the school was a religious institution. The court held that “the school’s nondiscrimination 
policy [did] not constitute a waiver of the ministerial exception’s protections.” Id. A school may be an equal-
opportunity employer and need not exclude members of other faiths to be deemed a religious institution. Id. 
 213 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192 (2012). 
 214 Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 658–59. 
 215 Id. at 659. 
 216 Id. The court notes how this title is distinct from Perich’s role as a “called teacher” and formal title of 
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned” in Hosanna-Tabor. Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178, 191). 
 217 Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 659. The court’s reasoning stemmed from the fact that a teacher at a public school 
with a purely secular job may have the same title (such as Hebrew teacher, Spanish teacher, or French teacher). 
Id. The school argued that Hebrew is taught, in this context, as a religious exercise. Id. However, this argument 
did not change the court’s finding as to title. Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. Tal Am is the integrated Hebrew and Jewish Studies curriculum from which Grussgott taught 
Hebrew. Id. Grussgott could have obtained the required certification to teach this curriculum by completing 
seminars in either the United States or Israel. Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
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requirement that she follow the Tal Am curriculum and as perceived by others 
in hiring her based on past religious experience, “entail[ed] the teaching of the 
Jewish religion to students” and supported the application of the ministerial 
exception.223 However, the court found that Grussgott’s own use of her title, the 
third factor, cut against applying the ministerial exception, after “examin[ing] 
how [she] presented herself to the public.”224 
As to the fourth factor of the analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that 
Grussgott did perform “important religious functions” for the school, supporting 
application of the ministerial exception.225 The discussion surrounding this 
factor stemmed from the differing viewpoints of Grussgott and the school as to 
the significance of the subject matter she taught.226 Grussgott argued that 
teaching her students about prayer, the Torah, and Jewish holidays was a choice 
of topic rather than a charge from the school.227 However, the court still 
determined that “it [was] sufficient that the school clearly intended for her role 
to be connected to the school’s Jewish mission,”228 countering her discretionary 
planning argument.229 The school’s expectation that Grussgott followed the Tal 
Am curriculum “combined with the importance of [her] Judaic teaching 
experience in her being hired, confirm[ed] that the school expected her to play 
an important role in ‘transmitting the [Jewish] faith to the next generation.’”230 
Even if Grussgott did not know these were the school’s expectations of her, “the 
purpose of the ministerial exception is to allow religious organizations the 
freedom to hire or fire those who shape their faith,”231 and therefore it is the 
 
 223 Id. at 660. 
 224 Id. at 659. The court found that there was no evidence that Grussgott “held herself out to the community 
as an ambassador of the Jewish faith, nor that she understood that her role would be perceived as a religious 
leader.” Id. She consistently defined her role as a teacher of the “historical, cultural, and secular, rather than the 
religious.” Id. 
 225 Id. at 660. 
 226 Id. It is undisputed that Grussgott taught her students about Jewish holidays, prayer, and the Torah, and 
she practiced religion alongside her students. Id. She distinguished practicing and teaching prayer from leading 
prayer, and distinguished teaching from a cultural perspective from a religious perspective. Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. The court compared the facts in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Court considered it important that Perich 
was “expressly charged” with “lead[ing] others to Christian maturity,” with the school’s expectation here that 
Grussgott follow its “expressly religious mission and to teach the Tal Am curriculum . . . designed to ‘develop 
Jewish knowledge and identity in [its] learners.’” Id. at 660–61 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192 (2012)); see Mission, HEBREW AND HERITAGE CURRICULA FOR 
JEWISH SCHOOLS, http://www.talam.org/mission.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2020)). 
 229 Id. at 660. 
 230 Id. at 661 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192). The court here also noted that, although Grussgott 
claimed that any religious tasks she performed were voluntary, there was evidence she had occasionally been 
given religious tasks, such as taking second grade students to study a Torah portion. Id. 
 231 Id. 
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school’s expectations of religious teaching that matters.232 To avoid excessive 
entanglement, the court “defer[red] to the organization in situations like this one, 
where there is no sign of subterfuge.”233 Thus, the fourth factor weighed in favor 
of the school.234 
While the court in Grussgott concluded that at most two of the four 
Hosanna-Tabor factors were present, the duties and functions of Grussgott’s 
position outweighed the formalistic factors like her title and her own use of that 
title.235 “Her job entailed many functions that simply would not be part of a 
secular teacher’s job at a secular institution,”236 and, despite a few factual 
disputes in the case, the court held that Grussgott’s own admissions about her 
job were enough to establish coverage by the ministerial exception.237 
In comparison with the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in two separate 
cases, gave greater analytical weight to title and employees’ use of that title, but 
only found that one of the four factors—function—favored ministerial status, as 
opposed to the (at most) two factors found in Grusgott.238 The Ninth Circuit 
demonstrated a wariness of uniform tests and a propensity to narrowly define a 
minister in the pre-Hosanna-Tabor era.239 In the case of Biel v. St. James School, 
the court held for Biel, a fifth grade teacher at St. James Catholic school who 
brought a disability discrimination claim for violation of the ADA against her 
employer.240 She brought this claim after she had informed her employer she 
would have to miss work to undergo chemotherapy, and she was subsequently 
terminated.241 The district court granted summary judgment for St. James on the 
grounds that the ministerial exception barred Biel’s claim.242 Biel appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, which conducted the Hosanna-Tabor analysis to determine 
 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 660. The court noted that this approach does not mean they may “never question a religious 
organization’s designation of what constitutes religious activity.” Id. However, in situations where religious line 
drawing, especially between “teaching religion” and “teaching about religion,” is extremely difficult and would 
excessively entangle the government in religious affairs, deference is given to the organization. Id.; see Sch. 
Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 234 Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 660. 
 235 Id. at 661. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See id.; Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019). These cases were later consolidated by the Supreme Court, 
but for purposes of Part I.C.4, the lower court decisions are discussed to illustrate the development of circuit 
splits. 
 239 Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 240 Biel, 911 F.3d at 605. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 605, 607. 
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whether Biel qualified as a minister under the exception.243 In doing so, the court 
conducted a side-by-side analysis comparing the facts supporting each part of 
the test in Hosanna-Tabor with those in Biel.244 The court also reiterated that 
“the determination of who is a minister is a totality of the circumstances test [by 
which the court must] consider ‘all the circumstances of [Biel’s] employment’ 
in the assessment of her role.”245 
As to the first and second parts of the test, St. James did not hold Biel out as 
a minister, nor did Biel’s title reflect ministerial substance or training.246 Biel’s 
title was “Grade 5 Teacher,” which reflects no religious meaning.247 In contrast 
to Perich, who could only be terminated by a supermajority vote of the 
congregation, Biel’s employment was at-will and on a renewable contract.248 
Biel “ha[d] none of Perich’s credentials, training, or ministerial background.”249 
Biel received a liberal arts degree, and her position at St. James required no 
religious background.250 The only training she received was a half-day 
conference that taught attendees how to incorporate religious teachings into 
daily lessons, along with techniques for teaching secular subjects, like art.251 
Finally, the court noted that Biel’s past work for tutoring companies, public 
schools, another Catholic school, and a Lutheran school indicated no 
commitment to the religious aspects of a teaching role and was no indication that 
she saw teaching ministry as a calling.252 The court also noted that nothing in 
the record indicated that Biel considered or held herself out as a minister, as 
“[s]he described herself as a teacher and claimed no benefits available only to 
ministers.”253 
The only indication of ministerial function, the court found, was with respect 
to the fourth consideration: “whether the employee’s job duties included 
‘important religious functions.’”254 Biel taught lessons on Catholicism for thirty 
 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 608–09. 
 245 Id. at 619; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 
(2012) (“It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the 
exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 608. 
 248 Id. at 608–09. 
 249 Id. at 608. 
 250 Id. at 605, 608. 
 251 Id. at 605. 
 252 Id. at 608. 
 253 Id. at 609. 
 254 Id. at 607 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192 
(2012)). 
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minutes a day, four days a week.255 These lessons, however, came from a book 
required by the school.256 She incorporated religious themes and symbols into 
her classroom environment and curriculum, also required by the school.257 Biel’s 
students led class prayers, and Biel joined them in prayer but did not teach, lead, 
or plan them herself.258 These facts directly contrast with those surrounding 
Perich, who planned the daily prayers for her students.259 Biel was also required 
to accompany her students to monthly mass and to make sure they were well-
behaved, while Perich curated and led religious services for the school 
throughout the year.260 The tasks St. James gave to Biel, the court held, “d[id] 
not amount to the kind of close guidance and involvement that Perich had in her 
students’ spiritual lives.”261 
In keeping with the constitutional and policy considerations underlying the 
decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the court in Biel found that, in viewing all 
circumstances holistically, Biel was not a minister and therefore was not barred 
by the ministerial exception from bringing a claim against St. James.262 Only 
one of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors even had the potential to weigh in favor 
of St. James, and one was not enough.263 The court reversed the district court’s 
decision, stating that “we cannot read Hosanna-Tabor to exempt from federal 
employment law all those who intermingle religious and secular duties but who 
do not ‘preach [their employers’] beliefs, teach their faith, . . . carry out their 
mission . . . [and] guide [their religious organization] on its way.”264 
In Biel, the court mentioned an argument made by St. James that a contrary 
conclusion should have been reached based on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Grussgott v. Milwaukee.265 The court responded that, “assuming Grussgott was 
correctly decided, . . . the plaintiff in Grussgott more closely resembled Perich 
than Biel.”266 Grussgott’s religious functions were slightly more significant than 
 
 255 Id. at 605. 
 256 Id. at 609. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. 
 260 Id.; Biel, 911 F.3d at 609. 
 261 Biel, 911 F.3d at 609. 
 262 Id. at 610. Here, the Ninth Circuit seemingly continued the “reasonable construction” approach it had 
in place prior to Hosanna-Tabor, looking at the factors under consideration holistically. Id.; Alcazar v. Corp. of 
the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, it stayed consistent with 
Hosanna-Tabor while not forcing itself to reach the same employer-favoring result. Biel, 911 F.3d at 611. 
 263 Biel, 911 F.3d at 610. 
 264 Id. at 611. 
 265 Id. at 609 (citing Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018)). 
 266 Id. 
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Biel’s, in part by virtue of the subjects she taught and their easy conflation with 
administration of religion, along with her “significant religious teaching 
experience.”267 Functional similarities between Perich, Grussgott, and Biel 
existed in the requirement that they each taught religion at some point 
throughout the day or week, but each teacher’s role diverged on how prevalent 
religious teaching was to be.268 Of note is the question the Ninth Circuit posed 
of whether Grussgott was decided correctly.269 This question became a subject 
of debate among various circuits, scholars, and attorneys. Was Grussgott wrong 
and Biel correct? Was Biel wrong and Grussgott correct? Were both correct 
based on the flexibility of the Hosanna-Tabor analysis and thus a predicate for 
the inconsistencies to come? Regardless, the Supreme Court would soon take a 
stance, deeming the Biel decision incorrect.270 
Shortly after Biel, the Ninth Circuit again had the opportunity to address the 
ministerial exception in Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School.271 
While it found the same factor—function—to be the only one indicative of 
ministerial status, the facts were significantly more indicative of ministerial 
status, perhaps to an extent greater than in Grussgott.272 Morrissey-Berru, a 
teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, brought a claim against the school 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging she was moved from 
a full-time contract to a part-time contract because of her age.273 After the lower 
court held that Morrissey-Berru’s claim was barred by the ministerial exception, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the employee was not a minister for the 
following reasons: her formal title was “Teacher,” she had no religious 
credentials, training, or ministerial background outside of taking one course on 
the history of the Catholic Church, she did not hold herself out to be a minister, 
and her religious functions, though significant, were not on their own sufficient 
to apply the exception.274 The “significant religious responsibilities” to which 
the court referred were that “[Morrissey-Berru] was committed to incorporating 
Catholic values and teachings into her curriculum, [she] led her students in daily 
prayer, was in charge of liturgy planning for a monthly Mass, and directed and 
 
 267 Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 659. 
 268 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 204 (2012); Biel, 
911 F.3d at 609; Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 656. 
 269 Biel, 911 F.3d at 609. 
 270 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020). 
 271 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 272 Id. at 461. 
 273 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 16-cv-09353-SVW-AFM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
217504, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017). 
 274 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461. 
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produced [an annual Easter performance].”275 These religious functions are 
significantly greater than those in Biel, and by holding that Morrissey-Berru was 
not a minister, the court limited application of the exception to a unique 
extent.276 
While it is not certain whether the individual plaintiffs in Grusgott, Biel, and 
Morrissey-Berru would have fared differently had their jurisdictions been 
swapped, the distinct modes of analysis employed in both circuits indicate that, 
perhaps, they could have. Morrissey-Berru, in particular, would likely have 
faced the opposite result if analyzed by the Grusgott Court. The inconsistencies 
among circuits and intra-circuit debate between majority and dissenting opinions 
stemmed from the flexibility of the Hosanna-Tabor four-factor analysis, and left 
both employers and employees not knowing where they stand.277 However, the 
Supreme Court has now made clear that the Ninth Circuit’s approach was wrong, 
emphasizing the immense significance of religious function and frequent 
insignificance of the other three factors.278 
D. Morrissey-Berru: A Broad Reframing of Hosanna-Tabor 
In 2020, the ministerial exception once again made its way to the Supreme 
Court with the consolidated cases of Morrissey-Berru and Biel.279 Whereas the 
factual backgrounds of these two cases have been discussed above, this 
Comment now turns to the Court’s particular analysis of these facts.280 The 
Supreme Court held that both Morrissey-Berru and Biel were ministers under 
the exception, and that in holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit “misunderstood” 
 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id.; see Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018). In Biel, the Ninth Circuit advocated 
for a totality of the circumstances analysis as set forth by Hosanna-Tabor, which led them to hold that Biel was 
not a minister. Id. In comparison to the teacher in Morrissey-Berru, Biel’s religious functions were minimal. In 
its analysis in Morrissey-Berru, however, the Ninth Circuit seemed to conduct a different analysis, holding that 
a teacher was not a minister when the facts, more so than in Biel, indicated she was. Though it purported to look 
at the totality of the circumstances, the court seemingly looked at the totality of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors 
and disregarded the fact that Morrissey-Berru’s functions may have been significant enough to tip the scale 
toward ministerial status. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460. The court sought satisfaction of more than one 
factor, rather than satisfaction that the totality of the circumstances, which may have pointed toward a finding 
of ministerial status. 
 277 See Biel, 911 F.3d at 608 (“The dissent’s analysis of Biel’s title focuses on her duties at the school—
as opposed to her education, qualifications, and employment arrangement—and thus improperly collapses 
considerations that the Supreme Court treated separately.”). 
 278 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2063 (2020). 
 279 Id. at 2056. 
 280 Id. at 2066. Significantly, the Court did not formally conduct the Hosanna-Tabor four-factor analysis 
as lower courts had done. For example, it did not specifically address the third factor: how the employees held 
themselves out. See id. at 2066–67. 
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Hosanna-Tabor by treating its four factors as a checklist, thus distorting the 
analysis.281 As to title, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit “invested undue 
significance in the fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel did not have clerical 
titles.”282 Instead, the Court noted that the fact that they were Catholic school 
teachers meant they were their students’ primary religious teachers, and that this 
“concept of a teacher of religion [was] loaded with religious significance.”283 
Next, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit gave “too much weight to the 
fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious schooling than 
Perich.”284 It stated that the significance of formal training will often depend on 
the level of schooling—for example, whether the position was at an elementary 
school versus a divinity school—as well as the school’s judgment regarding 
whether such training is necessary.285 Here, because the schools thought 
Morrissey-Berru and Biel had sufficient understanding of Catholicism to teach 
their students, the Court held that it was in no position to question the schools’ 
judgments.286 
Third, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit “inappropriately diminished the 
significance of Biel’s duties” by emphasizing that “[she] merely taught ‘religion 
from a book required by the school,’ ‘joined’ students in prayer, and 
accompanied students to Mass in order to keep them ‘quiet and in their seats.’”287 
The Court held that this analysis misrepresented the record and its significance, 
that many teachers teach closely to textbooks, and that “many faith traditions 
prioritize teaching from authoritative texts.”288 Biel “prayed with her students, 
taught them prayers, supervised the prayers led by students, prepared them for 
Mass, accompanied them to Mass, and prayed with them there.”289 Regarding 
Morrissey-Berru, the Court held that her assertion that she was not a practicing 
Catholic did not disqualify her under the exception, and, further, that requiring 
courts to more deeply explore what being a practicing Catholic meant would 
“put [religious employers] in an impossible position.”290 Beyond this analysis, 
the Court did not delve deeper into Morrissey-Berru’s functions, likely because 
 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 2067. 
 283 Id. The Court supports this idea with the fact that the term “rabbi” means “teacher” and that Jesus was 
often referred to as “rabbi.” Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 2067–68. 
 286 Id. at 2068. 
 287 Id. (citing Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. at 2069. 
BARRICK_12.2.20 12/3/2020 1:17 PM 
500 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:465 
the lower court seemed to indicate that her religious functions would have 
qualified her under the exception, had the other factors been satisfied.291 The 
Court held that neither title nor the academic requirements of a positions are 
always important, and that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee does,” 
effectively adopting Justice Alito’s concurrence from Hosanna-Tabor.292 “[I]t is 
sufficient,” the Court held, “to decide the cases before us” without adopting a 
rigid formula.293 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Morrissey-Berru argues that the majority’s 
decision was a “step in the right direction,” but further emphasizes the 
importance of deferring to religious groups’ “good-faith understandings of 
which individuals are charged with carrying out the organizations’ religious 
missions.”294 Such deference will allow courts to avoid governmental 
interference into the right of a religious group “to shape its own faith and mission 
through its appointments.”295 The concurrence looked to the record in this case, 
including faculty handbooks and teaching contracts, stating that it “confirms the 
sincerity of petitioners’ claims” that Biel and Morrissey-Berru held ministerial 
roles, despite being lay teachers.296 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent—which Justice Ginsberg joined—
argued that the majority, “in foreclosing the teachers’ claims . . . skew[ed] the 
facts, ignore[d] the applicable standard of review, and collapse[d] Hosanna-
Tabor’s careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its 
employees play an important religious role.”297 While the majority—and to a 
greater extent, the concurrence—emphasized the importance of deference to the 
religious institution and a broad exception to achieve that deference, the dissent 
emphasized the importance of a narrow exception to account for the exception’s 
“stark departure from antidiscrimination law” and “potential for abuse.”298 The 
dissent argued that under the true Hosanna-Tabor approach and common sense, 
the teachers in this case were not ministers, especially because the employers 
 
 291 See Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(“Morrissey-Berru did have significant religious responsibilities . . . . However, an employee’s duties alone are 
not dispositive under Hosanna-Tabor’s framework.”). 
 292 Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064; see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171, 200 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 293 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2069. The Court noted that lower courts had been applying the 
ministerial exception for years “without such a formula.” Id. The Court was correct, despite that application 
being short of consistent. 
 294 Id. at 2070–71 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 295 Id. at 2071 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 298 Id. at 2072–73. 
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sought summary judgment and thus the facts must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the employees.299 
In conducting its own analysis, the dissent noted that, in addition to language 
about the religious mission of the schools, the employment contracts also 
referred to Biel and Morrissey-Berru as “teacher” and directed them to the 
benefits guides for “Lay Employees.”300 This “lay teacher” status, the dissent 
stated, has been long recognized as a “mark” of non-ministerial status.301 
Further, the dissent deemed irrelevant the majority’s argument that “attaching 
too much significance to titles would risk privileging religious traditions with 
formal organizational structures over those that are less formal.”302 It did so 
because the cases at hand were not about such “less formal” religions but rather 
about the Catholic Church, which has a “publicized and undisputedly ‘formal 
organizational structure.’”303 The dissent then noted, as to the third factor of the 
Hosanna-Tabor analysis, that neither teacher had significant degrees of religious 
training and that neither teacher held herself out as a leader in the faith 
community.304 It also criticized the majority for failing to “grapple with this third 
component of the Hosanna-Tabor inquiry” at all.305 Lastly, the dissent looked 
to Biel and Morrissey-Berru’s functions, noting that the amount of time they 
spent on secular subjects surpassed their time teaching religion, and that their 
more specific religious roles were not sufficient to make them ministers.306 The 
dissent argued that, if teaching religion alone dictated ministerial status, then 
Hosanna-Tabor “wasted precious pages discussing titles, training, and other 
objective indicia.”307 Warning of the repercussions this result posed, the dissent 
cautioned that the majority’s conclusion puts not only secular teachers in 
religious schools at risk, but also subjects “coaches, camp counselors, nurses, 
social-service workers, in-house lawyers . . . and many others who work for 
religious institutions” to discrimination for reasons unrelated to religion.308 
 
 299 Id. at 2076. 
 300 Id. at 2077. 
 301 Id. at 2079. 
 302 Id. at 2064, 2079. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. at 2080. The dissent noted that the employees did not claim any benefits available only to spiritual 
leaders and did not hold themselves out as anything other than a fifth-grade teacher. Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 2081. 
 308 Id. at 2082 (“Little if nothing appears left of the statutory exemptions after today’s constitutional 
broadside. So long as the employer determines that an employee’s ‘duties’ are ‘vital’ to ‘carrying out the mission 
of the church,’ then today’s laissez faire analysis appears to allow that employer to make employment decisions 
[for discriminatory reasons] having nothing to do with religion.”). 
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While Morrissey-Berru did provide a reframed Hosanna-Tabor analysis 
focused on function and deference to the religious institution, the dissent may 
be correct in fearing that the Court opened the exception up for greater abuse, 
thus posing a new challenge for lower courts apart from inconsistency. The 
better solution still may have been to clarify Hosanna-Tabor in a way that 
encourages courts to look to the purpose of the exception through each factor. 
Part II briefly addresses the solutions that have already been adopted by courts 
or proposed by scholars in response to Hosanna-Tabor’s ambiguities. 
II. APPROACHES PROPOSED IN THE POST-HOSANNA-TABOR ERA 
Hosanna-Tabor left lower courts with great discretion in the analysis it 
provided. Most courts have construed the test broadly and have made a finding 
of ministerial status where religious function is present. The Ninth Circuit took 
a narrower approach and, while the result in Biel may seem attractive in light of 
discrimination policy concerns, the result likely would have been different in 
another circuit. Section A addresses the solutions that have been adopted and 
proposed—by courts and scholars alike—regarding the appropriate balance of 
function and title. It further discusses the approaches that have been put into 
practice by courts,309 but which are either inadequate or have departed too far 
from precedent to garner circuit-wide application. Section B then summarizes 
an approach that calls for a clear bifurcation of the employee’s secular and 
religious functions. 
A. Function Versus Title 
Different circuits have formulated different adaptations of Hosanna-Tabor 
that turn upon the balance of function and title.310 These adaptations include the 
Second Circuit’s “sliding-scale,”311 the Second Circuit’s substance- and 
 
 309 See supra Part I.C. 
 310 Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 29, 2019); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Grussgott v. 
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 
700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012)); Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 
2017). 
 311 Aparicio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15; Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182. 
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function-over-title approach,312 and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ slightly 
varied function and title balancing approach.313 
The sliding-scale approach illustrated by Penn v. New York Methodist 
Hospital argued that, where an employee’s role is extensively religious, that 
employee can be deemed a minister even if the employer institution is almost 
fully secular.314 Such a sliding-scale brings up an issue of line-drawing that may 
be so difficult that it renders the approach both unmanageable and an affront to 
antidiscrimination laws. Though the employee in Penn was arguably a minister 
in the most fundamental sense, the employer had affirmatively become non-
sectarian.315 Therefore, Penn represented a case of the ministerial exception 
being offered to a non-religious employer—a far jump from the exemption’s 
core purpose under Title VII and the Constitution.316 Further, it is unclear how 
the sliding-scale approach would function practically in the opposite direction, 
as it could encourage a finding of ministerial status for a highly secular employee 
in the context of a clearly religious organization. Such a result may allow courts 
to extend the exception to any employee who conducts a minor religious task or 
shares a minor religious characteristic akin to the secular hospital’s mission 
statement. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Fratello illustrates a function-over-title 
approach reminiscent of the primary duties test.317 The Fratello approach first 
gave a great deal of deference to lower courts in allowing them to apply all, 
some, or none of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors.318 While it went through the 
four-factor analysis and concluded, perhaps correctly based on the facts, that the 
employee was a minister, its immediate posture was that function is key, and the 
other factors are mere recommendations.319 Taking a similar function-over-title 
approach, the Seventh Circuit in Grussgott held that satisfaction of two factors—
the employee’s function, and the substance reflected by the employee’s title—
was consistent with Hosanna-Tabor and sufficient to find the employee was a 
 
 312 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 202. This approach mirrors Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, and 
his statement that the lower courts should keep an eye toward function in making their determination of who is 
or is not a minister for purposes of the exception. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171, 203 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). The employee’s label served merely as shorthand for the more 
important function and substance reflected therein. Id. at 202–03. 
 313 Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661. 
 314 Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182. 
 315 Id. at 182–83. 
 316 U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 317 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205, 209; see supra Part I.C. 
 318 Fratello, 863 F.3d at 204–05. 
 319 Id. at 205–06. 
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minister under the exception.320 Though the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
not all four factors must be present in every case, it considered them a framework 
under which each factor should be considered.321 Ultimately affirming a most 
extreme function-over-title approach, the Supreme Court held in Morrissey-
Berru that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee does,” that function 
alone is sufficient, and that circumstances relating to title may have far less 
significance in some cases.322 
The idea of functional separation is also reflected in a more radical 
proposition: limiting the exception to instances of religious motivation.323 A 
religious motivation limitation effectively calls for a return to the plain language 
of section 702 of Title VII, which explicitly exempts religious organizations only 
from the prohibition on employment discrimination for religious purposes, with 
no specification as to any other discriminatory purpose.324 Commentators like 
Katherine Hinkle and Benton Martin have called for this approach.325 This 
approach asks courts to look only to whether the employment decision “was 
motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”326 The religious employer would 
 
 320 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 321 Id. at 658–59; cf. Fratello, 863 F.3d at 204–05 (interpreting Hosanna-Tabor to be an instruction “only 
as to what [courts] might take into account as relevant, including the four considerations on which it 
relied . . . [but which neither] limits the inquiry to those considerations nor requires their application in every 
case”). 
 322 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2063–64 (2020). The Ninth Circuit 
in Morrissey-Berru, in contrast, reasoned that religious function alone, even if significant, is not enough for a 
court to conclude an employee is a minister. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x. at 461. It took this idea from Biel, 
but perhaps did so incorrectly, as the religious duties of the employee in Biel were significantly less than those 
in Morrissey-Berru. Id.; Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018). It is not clear whether Biel 
required more than one of the four factors to be satisfied or whether function alone did not suffice based on the 
minimal religious duties. Id. at 610. However, the Ninth Circuit’s Morrissey-Berru interpretation did not employ 
a reasonable construction of the exception. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461; see supra text accompanying 
note 76. 
 323 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338. 
 324 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (indicating that the prohibition on employers with more than fifteen employees 
from religious discrimination does not apply to “any religious corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society” that hires individuals of the associated religion to perform work connected with the activities of that 
religion). 
 325 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338; Benton Martin, Comment, Protecting Preachers from Prejudice: 
Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII, 59 EMORY L.J. 1297, 1334 (2010). 
Notably, Martin’s comment was written prior to Hosanna-Tabor; however, Hinkle’s reiteration of the idea in 
the post-Hosanna-Tabor era indicates that it is still a proposition that many consider. 
 326 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 340; see also Martin, supra note 325, at 1334–35 (“[A] new paragraph should 
be added . . . that shifts to religious organizations the burden of producing a religious justification for their 
alleged employment discrimination. . . . If no such religious justification is produced, the court can proceed in 
evaluating the minister’s claim. . . . If a religious justification is produced, the court’s inquiry will be limited to 
determining whether the evidence proves that the religious justification is merely pretext.”). 
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carry the burden of providing this religious justification,327 and the court, if 
satisfied with the justification, would then be barred from hearing the case 
further.328 If the court is not satisfied with the religious justification, it should 
proceed in evaluating the claim.329 However, since the McClure case in 1972, 
which affirmed that the ministerial exception applied in cases of gender 
discrimination, the exception’s application to all varieties of discrimination has 
been continually reiterated.330 In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
exception and its wide scope were rooted in the Constitution,331 and now that the 
Supreme Court has once again affirmed an even broader exception,332 it is 
unlikely the Court would return to a religious motivation limitation as proposed 
in both Hinkle and Martin’s scholarship.333 
B. Bifurcation of Secular and Religious Duties 
Two common questions pervade each case in which an employee has both 
religious and secular duties: first, how are these distinct duties balanced; and 
second, at what point does one so outweigh the other so as to strike the balance 
in its favor? The courts have acknowledged that the existence of secular duties 
among a slew of religious duties does not detract from the religiosity of an 
employee’s position nor his or her ministerial status.334 However, commentators 
have voiced a concern for fairness regarding cases in which an employee, whose 
role is largely secular, is deemed a “minister” based on the relatively minor 
religious roles that the employee undertakes.335 These commentators have called 
for, instead, a bifurcation or “disaggregat[ion]” of the religious and secular roles 
of employees.336 
 
 327 Martin, supra note 325, at 1334–35. Martin argues that this approach could be solidified with an 
amendment to Title VII explicitly shifting the burden of proving a religious justification to the employer. Id. at 
1334. 
 328 Hinkle, supra note 76, at 340–41. Hinkle is unclear regarding whether a court should proceed with the 
Hosanna-Tabor analysis or a Hosanna-Tabor-type analysis after it has concluded that a religious motivation 
exists, or whether existence of a good faith religious motivation is enough to bar the case completely. Id. 
 329 Id. at 340. Hinkle is again unclear as to whether, if no religious motivation exists, a court should hear 
the claim as it would any other employment discrimination case, or whether a Hosanna-Tabor analysis should 
be conducted. Id. at 340–41. 
 330 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 331 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189–90, 194–95 (2012). 
 332 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020). 
 333 See Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338; Martin, supra note 325, at 1334. 
 334 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193. 
 335 See, e.g., Jed Glickstein, Note, Should the Ministerial Exception Apply to Functions, Not Persons?, 
122 YALE L.J. 1964, 1977 (2013). 
 336 Id. at 1975; Interview with Michael J. Broyde, Professor of Law, Emory Univ. Sch. of L. (Oct. 7, 2019) 
(on file with author). 
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The basic idea behind this approach is that “the same employee can function 
ministerially at one moment, but nonministerially the next,” and that an 
employee who serves a blend of both functions should be able to claim damages 
on the portion of their position that was not ministerial.337 Jed Glickstein best 
illustrates the reason for this approach, which he calls a “blended approach,” 
through a hypothetical involving two employees, Jane and John, a brother and 
sister who both work as janitors for a church.338 The only difference between the 
siblings is that six months into her tenure, Jane is asked to work as a part-time 
organist for the church in addition to her role as a janitor.339 The following 
hypothetical illustrates this approach: 
[A]s organist, Jane regularly performs at church services under the 
supervision of the local pastor, but for the other twenty hours she 
continues to perform the same duties as her brother. Six more months 
pass, until the church suddenly fires both John and Jane on the same 
day and in an identical manner. Based on some overheard comments 
and circumstantial evidence, the siblings come to believe they were 
both fired on account of their race. After filing the appropriate notices 
with the EEOC, they sue.340 
Glickstein argues that, under existing law, a court would likely find Jane to be a 
minister covered by the exception and thus barred from bringing her claim, while 
John could likely proceed with his.341 This disparity is what the blended or 
bifurcated approach seeks to address.342 At its core, the approach critiques the 
idea that if one is a minister at all, then one is a minister always.343 It requires us 
to look at an employee’s position—which may consist of multiple roles and 
duties, both ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical—and examine what portion of 
the employee’s job can be characterized as secular for purposes of bringing 
suit.344 
The difficulty of bifurcating the roles of an employee under this approach 
would vary based on the legal claim and remedies sought.345 For example, in the 
case of an employee seeking purely monetary damages, the court would have to 
 
 337 Glickstein, supra note 335, at 1974–75. 
 338 Id. at 1972, 1974. 
 339 Id. at 1972. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. Glickstein states that such an outcome, where “two people who are, in important ways, similarly 
situated and similarly harmed” receive disparate treatment, is deeply unintuitive. Id. 
 342 Id. at 1973–74. 
 343 Id. at 1974. 
 344 Id. at 1974–75. 
 345 Id. at 1975. 
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determine what portion of the employee’s salary was earned from his or her 
secular role, and the church would face liability to the employee only for that 
portion of his or her role.346 Reinstatement would be a more complex issue, as it 
more deeply roots the government in the hiring decisions of the religious 
institution—contrary to the purpose of the exception.347 
While this blended approach, in its rejection of all factors outside of 
function, somewhat aligns with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Morrissey-
Berru, it does not account for instances where those first three factors—whether 
the religious institution held the employee out as a minister, whether the 
employee’s title reflected a certain degree of religious training, and whether the 
employee used the title and held herself out to be a minister—may be 
informative.348 Even under the function-focused precedent of Morrissey-Berru, 
to completely ignore all these indicia of ministerial status and focus purely on 
the day-to-day duties of an employee for remedy calculation may too severely 
simplify the ministerial exception and its purpose, especially in cases where the 
formal factors play a key role.349 Further, the approach diverges from Morrissey-
Berru and Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor in that it would 
diminish “the constitutional protection of religious teachers . . . when they take 
on secular functions in addition to their religious ones.”350 
III. CREATING A MORE CONSISTENT LANDSCAPE AND AVOIDING ABUSE: 
CLARIFYING AND NARROWING THE HOSANNA-TABOR FRAMEWORK 
The ministerial exception implicates two key areas of American 
jurisprudence: religious freedom and employment discrimination. For this 
reason, it is clear why creating the fairest and clearest mode of analysis is no 
simple task. What has also become clear, however, is that the Hosanna-Tabor 
test does not address some of the significant concerns surrounding the 
 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 1975–76. Returning to the hypothetical situation of the part-time organist and janitor, Glickstein 
notes that, if Jane were to be reinstated to her janitor role and not her organist role, it would pose two issues. Id. 
at 1976. First, it would run contrary to the usual mode of employment decisions, which are made at the individual 
employee level and not individual function level. Id. Second, it may economically burden the church if the reason 
it employed Jane part-time in each role is because it could not afford to employ full-time employees for each, or 
even because it did not want to. Id. Reinstatement thus poses too much risk of infringement by the government 
and runs too contrary to the goals of the exception and the First Amendment more generally, to ever likely be 
accepted. Id. 
 348 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066–67 (2020). 
 349 Glickstein, supra note 335, at 1978–79. 
 350 Id. at 1981 (“Admittedly, no court has yet suggested a blended approach to the ministerial exception, 
and those that have skirted the edges do not seem positively inclined.”). 
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ministerial exception and that Morrissey-Berru may have exacerbated the need 
for addressing those concerns. Part III proposes a solution to Hosanna-Tabor’s 
ambiguities by drawing upon pre-Hosanna-Tabor cases, Hosanna-Tabor itself, 
and subsequent cases, including Morrissey-Berru. This Part first addresses the 
foundations upon which the proposal is based. Section A then clarifies how 
function and title should be balanced, while section B explains how religious 
importance should be analyzed in the context of case-specific facts.  
A tendency toward favoring the religious employer has become evident in 
post-Hosanna-Tabor case law, and while courts have reasoned their way to this 
more common result, an air of result-chasing still lingers.351 This result-driven 
analysis is clear in the majority’s framing of the facts in Morrissey-Berru.352 
Even if courts are not motivated by result, the extension of the ministerial 
exception in most circuits since 2012 has been very broad, resulting in holdings 
that mirror the Court’s in Hosanna-Tabor.353 While this broad application is 
consistent with Hosanna-Tabor, based on Hosanna-Tabor’s sheer scope and 
deference to lower courts, reasoning among courts and among circuits has varied 
widely but has suspiciously resulted in identical outcomes for unique cases.354 
Perhaps dangerously, Morrissey-Berru confirmed and singled out the function-
focused analysis these lower courts had put into practice.355 
Hosanna-Tabor, in comparison with later circuit cases involving teachers, 
presented a fairly clear case of a minister.356 Perich had a ministerial title, the 
school held her out to be a minister and required significant religious training 
for her position, she claimed a special ministerial housing allowance on her 
taxes, and she served significant religious functions.357 She met all four factors, 
so the Court did not need to specify how each should be weighed.358 Given this 
lack of guidance and the fairly straightforward case surrounding Perich, lower 
courts should not have felt as confident as they did in applying Hosanna-Tabor 
 
 351 See, e.g., Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018); Fratello v. 
Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2017); Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 
F.3d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 352 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2077–78, 2080 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
asserted facts without citation and relied on disputed factual assertions in defiance of the summary judgment 
standard, which resulted in a holding favorable to the religious employer). 
 353 See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–61; Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205–06; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 179–80. 
 354 See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–61; Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205–06; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 179–80. This 
is not true of all courts, as the Ninth Circuit demonstrated by its employee-favoring holding in Biel. Biel v. St. 
James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 355 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064. 
 356 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 191–92 (2012). 
 357 Id. 
 358 See id. at 190–92. 
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in later cases of less clarity. The proposed new framework more specifically 
addresses how function and title should be balanced and how the religious 
importance of an employee should be analyzed based upon which facts, if 
introduced, carry the most weight in affirming or refuting ministerial status. 
Deriving from a similar concern about result-driven analyses, in 1959, 
Herbert Wechsler introduced his concept of “neutral principles.”359 Wechsler 
had become concerned about what seemed to him “an understandable judicial 
desire to produce specific results, principally in the area of race, [that] had begun 
to produce decisions [he] could not relate to a defensible rationale of 
interpretation or development.”360 Judges, he observed, were result-driven rather 
than process-driven—a troubling pattern in the wake of important race-related 
cases that deserved consistency in the judicial process.361 The neutral principles 
idea, he described, was not to be thought of as “a formula to guide or produce 
the decision of hard cases.”362 Rather, it was a “negative test . . . to be applied 
by a judge” in which that judge must consider “whether he is being adequately 
consistent in the process of adjudication, in reaching a particular type of result 
in a particular type of case.”363 
Thus, the proposed approach for ministerial exception cases shares a similar 
goal to Wechsler’s neutral principals: to urge consistency in judicial reasoning 
based on what makes sense, rather than based on achieving certain results.364 
This proposed approach seeks to achieve that goal, however, by more clearly 
defining the Hosanna-Tabor analysis based on prior case law, objective 
standards, and elements of contract law, rather than based fully on an existing 
body of secular law. The following approach also balances deference to religious 
organizations with judicial reasoning designed to objectively analyze and avoid 
unconstitutional interference.365 
 
 359 Norman I. Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from the 
Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 924–25 (1993) (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, n.† (1959)). 
 360 Id. at 924. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. at 925. 
 363 Id. In other words, Wechsler says that a judge must ask himself or herself, “Would I reach the same 
result if the substantive interests were otherwise?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 364 Id. at 924–25. 
 365 Id. This approach seeks to strike a balance similar to that in church property disputes: a civil court does 
not violate the First Amendment if it applies neutral principles of law to cases involving religious organizations, 
and if it defers to the church court for the resolution of religious doctrine. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 
235. Here, the neutral principles idea will be replaced by a set of standards derived from case law with an eye 
toward fairness, careful balancing, and avoiding any unconstitutional interference. 
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Further, the proposed framework seeks to avoid the slippery slope of an 
expanding ministerial exception. From the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and Title VII through the present, the ministerial exception, at its core, has 
protected religious discrimination by religious institutions against the most 
obvious ministers of those religious institutions—the clergy.366 What has 
evolved over time is the judicial interpretation of the constitutional exception 
and the expansion of what and who is covered in its penumbra. Since McClure, 
and as affirmed in Hosanna-Tabor, courts have applied the exception to cases 
involving all forms of discrimination367 and to employees in a variety of roles—
from priest to choral leader to called teacher to lay principal to lay teacher.368 
The open-endedness of the Hosanna-Tabor factors, combined with the 
pressure to favor the employer, raises the question of how far the exception may 
be extended over time, a question Morrissey-Berru answered, in a way. Lay 
teachers tasked with relatively minor religious duties, when compared with their 
secular duties, seem to be one of the grayer areas that courts, over the past eight 
years, have been navigating.369 This gray area risks preventing employees from 
knowing their rights in relation to their religious employers. However, based on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru, it seems that courts may be 
able, and may even be encouraged, to reason their way to ministerial status in 
cases involving any employee—so long as that employee in some way furthers 
the mission of the religious institution.370 This result would stray too far from 
the core purpose of the exception.371 While the following proposal does not aim 
to limit the exception to its core subjects—religious discrimination and obvious 
 
 366 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2071–72 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (noting that there are obvious and “commonsense” examples of ministers like a member of the 
Christian clergy or a rabbi). 
 367 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 179, 190 (2012) 
(disability discrimination); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (gender 
discrimination). While the ministerial exception has been applied to all forms of discrimination, it will not be 
applied in sex discrimination cases involving sexual harassment. See infra note 426. 
 368 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178, 190 (involving a kindergarten and fourth grade teacher at an 
Evangelical Lutheran school); Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655,659, 662 (7th Cir. 
2018) (involving a grade school teacher at a private Jewish day school); Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese 
of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) (involving the principal of a Roman Catholic School); Cannata v. 
Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2012) (involving the music director of a Catholic 
church). 
 369 Compare Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 196), with Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–62 (demonstrating the varied consideration and weight courts give 
to each circumstance of a teacher’s functions when those functions are both secular and religious). 
 370 See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 559–60. 
 371 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)) (noting that the exception ensures “that the authority to select and 
control who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone”). 
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ministers—it does aim to contain Hosanna-Tabor reasonably and with a concern 
for rights outside of just freedom of religion. It attempts to refine the Hosanna-
Tabor analysis to achieve more equitable results among circuits and avoid an 
application of the test so broad that the fundamental right to religious autonomy 
absolutely trumps other fundamental and statutory rights. 
An overarching question pervades each ministerial exception case: is the 
employee’s role important enough to the religious organization’s mission of 
transmitting the faith that interfering with the hiring or firing of that employee 
would unconstitutionally infringe on the religious organization’s free-exercise 
right?372 Most people have a general idea of what “transmitting the faith” may 
entail,373 and thus, upon hearing the facts of ministerial exception cases, would 
have an “immediate reaction[]” as to whether the employee-plaintiff plays an 
important role in fulfilling that mission.374 While the broadness of Hosanna-
Tabor has led to inconsistent and sometimes unintuitive interpretations, it also 
encourages an approach that looks at all circumstances objectively and 
reasonably and that balances those circumstances in a holistic manner.375 This 
new framework addresses, first, how to balance function and title, and second, 
how the religious importance of an employee should be analyzed considering 
the facts introduced. 
A. Balancing Function and Title  
Function is the most important of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors, as argued 
by Justice Alito in Hosanna-Tabor,376 many of the lower courts,377 and the 
Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru.378 However, Hosanna-Tabor expressly 
refused to adopt a “rigid formula,” indicate the weight of each factor in relation 
to one another, and indicate how many factors, if satisfied, were determinative 
of ministerial status.379 In the case of Perich in Hosanna-Tabor, the 
circumstances of both her title and function sufficed to prove she was a minister, 
 
 372 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89. 
 373 Id. at 192. 
 374 Silber & Miller, supra note 359, at 925. 
 375 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92. This holistic analysis is unlike the analysis proffered later by the 
Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru, which the dissent argued was unnecessarily broad in its deference to the 
religious employer and dismissive of any factor other than function. See 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2071–72 (2020) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 376 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S at 200 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 377 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018); Fratello v. Roman 
Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 378 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064, 2066, 2069. 
 379 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
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and that conclusion is all the Court left to lower courts as guidance.380 Therefore, 
lower courts took liberties in creating distinct modes of analyses, often focusing 
solely on function.381 
Morrissey-Berru took this a step further, deeming the Hosanna-Tabor 
factors outside the scope of function flexible to the point of insignificance, 
stating that “our recognition of the significance of those factors in Perich’s case 
did not mean that they must be met—or even that they are necessarily 
important—in all other cases.”382 This jump from a “non-rigid formula” to 
effectively making Hosanna-Tabor’s entire discussion of non-function factors a 
waste of “precious pages” cannot be right, especially when the reason for a 
balanced test is to provide some limit to the exception.383 
Contrary to these lower court interpretations and to the Supreme Court’s new 
stance, courts cannot choose to focus solely on function when more is at play 
and cannot simply ignore the fact that every one of the four factors in Hosanna-
Tabor was satisfied when the Court held Perich was a minister.384 The other 
three factors can be indicative, though not determinative, of ministerial status, 
and the desire to defer to the religious employer should not make courts blind to 
the employee.385 Function is most often key, and when function is so significant 
as to clearly meet the purpose of the exception, it can, and perhaps should, 
outweigh the lack of the other three more formal considerations.386 Exceedingly 
religious function should not just be ignored as it was in the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis of Morrissey-Berru.387 There, the Supreme Court fairly concluded that 
the employee was a minister under Hosanna-Tabor based on the very strong 
functional indicators that she was transmitting the faith.388 
Similarly, however, courts should not be reluctant to acknowledge when 
there is a lesser showing of religious function,389 instead of simply “trading legal 
analysis for a rubber stamp” of automatic ministerial status.390 A holistic analysis 
 
 380 Id. at 190–92. 
 381 See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 202. 
 382 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2063. 
 383 Id. at 2081 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 384 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. 
 385 Id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 386 Id. at 198–99. 
 387 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 388 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2066–69. 
 389 See id. The Court, for example, basically equated the weight of function-related facts in Biel to those 
in Morrissey-Berru, when in reality the facts in Biel were quite less indicative of ministerial status. 
 390 Id. at 2076 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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should still be employed.391 Even in Aparicio, where the Southern District of 
New York held the employee was not a minister, the court was extremely 
hesitant to come to a conclusion as to any of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors 
aside from function.392 When one of the four factors pointed largely toward not 
granting ministerial status, the smallest religious aspects pressed the court to 
disregard the factor entirely.393 By allotting a certain weight to each factor and 
to the circumstances within each factor, courts may feel more comfortable 
acknowledging factors outside of function, and if those factors are not strong 
indicators, they may receive less weight. 
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, and arguably even in Biel, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a reasonable construction as a guiding force in the context of the 
ministerial exception.394 This idea supports a reasonable balancing of the factors, 
depending on the circumstances supporting their application in each case. If, for 
example, factor three (whether the employee held herself out to be a minister or 
perceived herself that way), demonstrated a strong leaning against ministerial 
status, and title weighed only slightly more toward ministerial status than not, 
this would weigh against applying the exception. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis in 
Conlon employed a seemingly reasonable approach as well, serving as a model 
for the “reasonableness” aspect of the proposed analysis here.395 It held that two 
factors, title and function, weighed in favor of applying the ministerial 
exception.396 As to the other two factors—the substance reflected in the title and 
the employee’s use of the title—the evidence was either insufficient or 
unconvincing in relation to Hosanna-Tabor.397 In that case, it was a reasonable 
approach to understand religious title and religious function, if individually 
satisfied, to be sufficient when combined.398 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Morrissey-Berru illustrates a failure to apply a reasonable 
construction.399 Conceptualizing the analysis as a point system, the court 
basically allotted a single point per factor satisfied, when a better approach 
would have been to allot a few points to a factor if it was significantly satisfied, 
 
 391 Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., No. 18-CV-0592, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019). 
 392 Id. at *14–19. 
 393 See id. 
 394 Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2010). While 
the idea of a “reasonable construction” does not give a clear test, it does provide a more overarching idea of 
balance—which may be key to this kind of big implication analysis. 
 395 Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 834–835 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 396 Id. at 835. 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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and a single point if it was only slightly or vaguely satisfied.400 Further, the court 
failed to acknowledge that function does merit greater weight than the other 
three factors individually.401 
One of the main issues that has surrounded the four Hosanna-Tabor factors 
is not the factors themselves, but rather the lower court decisions, and now 
Supreme Court decision, to view individual factors as optional. Therefore, the 
four factors should remain in place but with a clearer instruction on how they 
should be balanced. Religious function should always be present for an 
employee to be considered a minister, in turn making it a requirement. Without 
any practical religious function, any intended religious importance becomes 
moot. Further, function alone may suffice to prove ministerial status if that 
function indicates a predominantly ministerial and functionally essential 
employee. Characterizing what types of functions and attributes indicate an 
employee “whose functions are essential to the independence of practically all 
religious groups” will also help guide the analysis more consistently.402 
The other three factors—the employee’s title, the substance reflected in that 
title, and the employee’s own perception of his or her role—must be considered 
and may be probative of ministerial status or a lack thereof, as held in Hosanna-
Tabor.403 Minimal religious function may be significantly supplemented by a 
title that reflects religious importance, the employer’s expectation that the 
employee transmit the faith, or an employee’s own use of their status as a 
minister. Minimal religious function, without any of the aforementioned formal 
factors, should not alone suffice. While a court may find, after analysis of these 
three factors, that they are not indicative of ministerial status, a court cannot 
simply choose to ignore all three.404 Title means little without any function to 
support it, as does the substance reflected in that title if not put into practice at 
all. Instances of an employee holding himself or herself out to be a minister, 
however, may hold greater weight, and as such demonstrate an embracing of 
ministerial status. Still, each factor depends on the facts proffered to support it, 
and which of those facts should reasonably be given significance. 
 
 400 See id. The court found only function was satisfied, but instead of giving that significant weight (as the 
employee’s functions were largely ministerial), the court found satisfaction of function to be insufficient by 
virtue of it being only a single factor. See id. 
 401 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2068 (2020). 
 402 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 200 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring); see supra Part II.B.2. 
 403 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192, 194. 
 404 See Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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B. Analyzing Religious Importance in the Context of Significant Facts 
Characterizing what types of functions and attributes indicate an employee 
“whose functions are essential to the independence of practically all religious 
groups” will also help guide the analysis more consistently.405 Further, 
characterizing what attributes indicate religious importance in an employee’s 
title, the substance reflected in that title, and the employee’s own perception of 
their role, are key to determining whether the factors other than function are 
satisfied. Both Starkman and Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor 
provide beneficial insight into what these attributes may be.406 
Religious importance is, in large part, demonstrated by the functional 
essentiality of an employee.407 Functionally essential employees may be 
characterized as “those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform 
important functions in worship services and in the performance of religious 
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying 
the tenets of the faith to the next generation.”408 If all of these are met, weight 
should be allocated to function, perhaps alone sufficient to indicate ministerial 
status. If only one is met, such as teaching the faith to the next generation, then 
less—but still significant—weight should be given toward ministerial status, 
depending on the extent to which the employee spreads the faith. Generally, facts 
that may indicate this functional importance include teaching a religious class 
beyond a historical perspective, leading prayer, and planning or leading multiple 
religious services monthly or even annually.409 
Ambiguity still exists, especially as to what “perform[ing] important 
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious ceremonies 
and rituals” means.410 Interpreted narrowly, it may mean the performance of 
functions that are literally a part of the formal religious service or ritual. More 
broadly, it may be interpreted to mean any function important to furthering the 
religious service or ritual—including keeping young students well-behaved.411 
 
 405 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 406 Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 407 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 408 Id. 
 409 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192; Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 
660 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2018); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 410 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200. 
 411 See id.; Biel, 911 F.3d at 609. The Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru takes this broader approach, 
equating Biel, an employee who accompanied her students to Mass and participated when they led prayer, to 
Morrissey-Berru or Perich, employees who, for example, led Masses, led their students in prayer, and directed 
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Keeping an eye toward the purpose of the exception as well as the purpose of 
this proposal, the narrower interpretation is more appropriate, despite potentially 
requiring courts to look, albeit at a surface level, at matters of religious 
doctrine.412 In that regard, Starkman also adds that if the employee “engaged in 
activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious,” the employee’s 
function should balance in favor of the exception.413 Determining what is 
“traditionally ecclesiastical or religious,” however, may be a difficult task for 
the court to engage in without delving too deeply into religion.414 
Next, the employment decisions surrounding the employee’s position, if 
made “largely on religious criteria,” should point toward religious 
importance.415 Certain facts indicate an express expectation of religiosity and 
should be given significant weight in the ministerial analysis. A key example 
would be a contract expressly allocating to an employee a religious title or 
consistent religious duties. Another example may be an offer letter expressing 
that past professional experience administering religion was the employer’s 
reason for hiring the employee. In conjunction with incidental facts of an 
employee’s actual religious duties, reputation, self-perception, and title, these 
formal expressions demonstrate an agreed-upon level of religiosity. 
Even more persuasive would be a contract expressly stating that the 
employee is a minister and thus subject to the ministerial exception, indicating 
a mutual understanding of and an agreement to its implications. Still, these types 
of documents alone would not suffice to prove ministerial status and would 
require a showing of ministerial function. If, for example, such a contract was to 
be taken at face value, even if the employee was in no practical way a minister, 
an employer could abuse the ministerial exception by including such a provision 
in all of its contracts. In Morrissey-Berru, for example, the Supreme Court 
majority relied heavily on the employment agreements stating that faculty were 
expected to help carry out the school’s core mission of “educating and forming 
students in the Catholic faith.”416 While this mission would provide context for 
employees’ subsequent religious functions, those functions must still then be 
weighed: Did the employee go above and beyond in fulfilling that mission? Did 
 
Easter plays. 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2059, 2066, 2068 (2020). 
 412 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237–38. To accommodate variation among religions, courts would 
likely have to know what a worship service, religious ceremony, or ritual looks like for the religion in question, 
though only at a base level. Id. at 238. 
 413 Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). 
 414 Id. 
 415 Id. at 176. 
 416 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2066. 
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the employee meet the bare minimum requirements to fulfill that mission? If the 
employee did only the bare minimum, was that amount sufficient to deem her a 
minister? In the case of Biel, her fulfillment of this mission seemed to be the 
bare minimum, and though she may have come close to ministerial status, she 
should not have been deemed a minister in looking at the context of her 
employment and the context of ministerial exception cases as a whole.417 
Situations in which an employee is identified as “called” or “lay” would also 
serve as an important indicator of ministerial status, as it may serve to support 
any or all of the factors of title, how the employer held out the employee, and 
how the employee held herself out or understood her role.418 Formal ordination, 
though a factor to consider, is a Judeo-Christian concept that does not have a 
“clear counterpart” in all religions.419 Thus, courts should be mindful of 
religions, such as Islam, in which every member of the religion “can perform the 
religious rites.”420 Considering characteristics unique to individual religions is 
not over-imposing and is necessary to account for pluralism, as well as to allow 
courts to differentiate between individuals who are simply relaying religious 
tenets as part of their employment duties from those who are ministering to the 
faithful as part of their employment duties.421 Finally, any religious certifications 
or trainings, if supported by detailed and formal program descriptions, may 
support a finding of religious importance and ministerial status. Vague mention 
of a religious training program or curriculum does not support a finding of 
ministerial status, as it leaves open questions as to the extensiveness of a 
program, voluntariness of completion, and importance to the employment in 
question and its religious aspects.422 
Clarification of the ministerial exception’s scope may be achieved by an act 
of Congress to better define Title VII in the context of religious employers, or 
by a new Supreme Court ruling. However, setting clear lines again runs the risk 
of excessive government entanglement with the church and infringement on 
employment decisions, making line-drawing difficult and perhaps something the 
Court is unlikely to do.423 Thus, if no such legislative or judicial guidance comes 
 
 417 Id. at 2071–72, 2077–78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 418 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92; Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 
659–60 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 419 Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 207 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198, 202 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 420 Id. 
 421 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 202 nn.3–4 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 422 See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 659. 
 423 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (declining to adopt a rigid formula); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. 
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2067 (2020) (affirming the denial to adopt a rigid formula). 
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along, the above proposal seeks to provide lower courts with a reasoned mode 
of analysis that could at least urge a more consistent application of Hosanna-
Tabor, and avoid the slippery slope that may accompany the Morrissey-Berru 
holding. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the proposed analysis would attempt to address some issues of 
consistency and fairness, the concerns still exist surrounding the ministerial 
exception’s application in general. Striking the perfect level of government 
involvement in matters of church-state relations is difficult to do. Zero 
involvement is not a feasible option, but beyond that, the ideal level is hard to 
define, though this proposal attempts to find a balance. 
Even with a clarified test, one concern deriving from the exception’s 
applicability to all antidiscrimination laws is whether courts will continue to be 
more focused on religious liberty of religious institutions than they are on other 
fundamental and statutory rights of the individual employee. Perhaps the 
exception really should be limited to cases of religious discrimination and, 
beyond that, discrimination laws should be deemed “valid and neutral law[s] of 
general applicability and therefore applicable to the Church, even if [they] 
impose[] a ‘substantial burden’ on [a religious institution’s] operation.”424 
Another concern is whether application of the exception enables abuses by 
religious institutions. While the level of abuse may be limited by a better-defined 
mode of analysis, as the number of employees falling under the exception would 
be restricted, potential for abuse would not be fully quashed as application of the 
exception at all could permit abuse of the exception for obvious ministerial 
employees.425 Lastly, does the government even truly achieve its goal of 
avoiding Establishment Clause issues through a ministerial exception? While 
one of the main stated goals of this exception is to avoid excessive entanglement 
and establishment of religion, through having such an exception the government 
seemingly favors religion over no religion by deeming antidiscrimination laws 
inapplicable to religious institutions. The Court in Amos explicitly denied 
 
 424 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237 (citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990)). 
 425 The ministerial exception does not bar sexual harassment claims, a positive limitation to potential abuse 
of the exemption. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment 
Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 
249, 250–51 (2019). 
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unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause, but that understanding does 
not assuage all doubt.426 
The proposal here attempts to address one gray area of the ministerial 
exception—who is a minister for purposes of the exemption and thereby barred 
from bringing suit against their religious employer. Through clarifying the 
balance between function and title and enumerating factors indicative of 
religious importance, this proposal draws upon the fundamental purpose of the 
ministerial exception and ensure courts’ analyses center on the idea of religious 
importance and essential religious functions. Now that the Supreme Court has 
dramatically broadened the ministerial exception, in accordance with some 
lower court practices, the exception may slowly be extended to cover cases less 
and less indicative of ministerial status, allotting to religious organizations 
excessive freedom to discriminate against any employee resembling a minister 
in any way. Surely the framers of the Constitution did not intend for religious 
institutions to be completely free from any law of general applicability short of 





 426 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–
30 (1987). 
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